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MATTHEW D. ADLER
AND SETH F . KREIMER

THE NEW ETIQUETTE OF
FEDERALISM: NEW YORK, PRINTZ,
AND YESKEY

A majority of the Supreme Court once more believes that state
autonomy is a fundamental, constitutional value and has set out to
develop that proposition from case to case. As a result, the Tenth
Amendment and its penumbrae have recently generated a series
of intricate, judicially declared limitations on federal power. The
jurisprudence of federalism has been bedecked with formalistic distinctions that provide law professors rich opportunity to chase law
students down a series of hypotheticals and into contradictions.
While this may be good fun for professors, and occasionally for
students, one suspects that the new federalism doctrines quickly
will drive political actors, judges, and practicing lawyers to distraction. The area lacks a fabric of constitutional law sufficiently coherent and well-justified to last.
This article focuses on the proposition that the federal government may not "commandeer" state officials, and the attendant
doctrines announced by the Court. The anticommandeering doctrines are of interest not only because they have impelled the
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Court to invalidate two federal statutes in the last seven years, but
because they are both unspecified and potentially explosive. • If developed expansively, they threaten to undermine the supremacy of
federal law.
The doctrines, as announced by the Court in Printz v U1zited
Statesl and New York v United States/ and reaffirmed last Term in
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections v Yeskey, 4 create a regime of
dichotomous boundaries. Like the federa lism jurisprudence set
forth, a generation ago, in National League of Cities v Usery, 5 the
new jurisprudence of commandeering purports to define an area
of total state (and local) immunity from federal intervention.6 Neither the magnitude of the federal interest nor the degree of interference with state prerogatives is relevant. Rather, the doctrinal
boundaries constitute what Justice Kennedy calls "the etiquette of
federalism," and a federal trespass across those boundaries is per
se invalid/
1 As Professor Tushnet has observed, "[Oine can use the word 'commandeer' to refer to
almost anything that affects a state's ability to pursue the substantive policies it prefers."
Mark Tush net, Kttping Your Eye on the 8111/: The Signifi(allct of the Revival of Constitutional
Federalism, 13 Ga St U L Rev 1065, 1067 (1997). Fo r examples of the potential reach of
the anticommandcering principle, sec Condon v Rmo, 155 F3d 453 (4th Cir 1998) (invalidating Driver's Privacy Protection Act, which prohibited dissemination of information contained in state motor vehicle records, as a commandeering); West v Anne Arrmdel County,
137 F3d 752, 760 (4th Cir 1998) (entertaining claim that application of the Fair Labor
Standards Act to state subdivision was a commandeering; rejecting only as a matter of sta re
decisis); Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airpo11 Auth. v City of Burbank, 136 F3d 1360, 136465 (9th Cir 1998) (Kozinski concurring) (arguing that empowering state officials to bring
a preemption claim in federal court might be commandeering). The anticommandeering
doctrines have already attracted considerable scholarly artemion. See, in particular, l~v:1n
H. Caminker, Printz, Stott Sovereignty, and tbe LimifJ" of Pom111li.rm, 1997 Supreme Court
Review 199; Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereigwy and Subo1-dinacy: May Congress CO'Imllaluleer
State Offi(ers to lmple11ltllt Federal Law? 95 Colum L Rev 1001 (1995); Roderick M. Hills,
Jr., The Political EconO'IIIY of Cooperative Ft1lrralism: Why State Amonumy Makes Smtt and
"Dual Sovmigmy" Doem't, 96 Mich L Rev 813 (1998); Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and
the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle? Ill Harv L Rev 2180 (1998).
1 117 S Ct 2365 (1997).
j 505
144 ( 1992).

us

• 118 S Ct 1952 (1998).
1
426 US 833 (1976), overruled, Garcia v San Amonio Metropolitan Tmnsit Amh., 469 US
528 (1985).
6
Although the Tench Amendment refers simply to "States," not localities, and although
the parallel reference to "State[s]" in the Eleventh Amendment has been read by the Court
solely to immunize states, nor localities, from suit, the anticonunandeering doctrines protect
both state and local governments. See Printz, 117 S Ct at 2382 n 15. For the remainder
of this article, we generally use "state" to mean "state or local."

1
United States v Lopez, 514 US 549, 583 (1995) (Kennedy concurring) (citing Nm York
as a case "where the etiquette of federalism has been violated by a fonnal command from
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In such a regime, a great deal hinges on the exact contours of
the area protected from federal infringement. If they are to be
consistent with precedent, the doctrinal boundaries that define this
area must map onto the outcomes of prior cases. If they are to be
workable, the boundaries must be intelligible and coherent. And
if they are to be at all intellectually persuasive, the boundaries cannot be simple result-oriented gerrymanders. Unfortunately, the
anticommandeering doctrines seem headed for trouble in all three
dimensions. In this article we seek to clarify as sympathetically as
possible the doctrinal boundaries between permissible federal regulation and impermissible commandeering, to assess those boundaries in light of the justifications for judicially enforced federalism,
and to explore the possibility of an expressive justification for the
boundaries that cannot be otherwise justified.8
Part I lays out our understanding of the basic pieces of the puzzle: the explicit lines of demarcation that the Court has drawn in
Printz, New York, and Yeskey, and the values that constitutional
federalism might be understood to realize. Part II argues that behind the explicit lines must lie a more basic distinction, alluded to
by the Court in Printz, between impermissible commandeering
and the permissible federal preemption of state law. We flesh out
the preemption/commandeeripg distinction, but conclude that the
distinction is only poorly justified by the values of constitutional
federalism.
Parts III and IV engage in the same exercise for the lines of
demarcation explicidy set forth by the case law. Part III addresses
the three distinctions adopted in New York and Printz: between
commandeering and conditional funding or preemption, between
generally applicable and targeted federal statutes, and between commandeering of state officials exercising the judicial function and
commandeering of other officials. In each case, the boundaries in
question seem to us both normatively insupportable and practically
unworkable. Part IV goes to the issue addressed in the most recent
commandeering case, Yeskey-whether an anticommandeering
the National Government directing the state to enact a certain policy . . . or to organize
its governmental functions in a certain way").
8
P1-inrz also sketched out a unitary executive argument for the amicommandeering doctrine. Sec 117 S Ct at 2378. We have nothing to add to Professor Caminker's persuasive
criticism of that argument, see 1997 Supreme Court Review at 223-33 (cited in note 1),
and thus focus here on the federalism argument.
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prohibition should include an exemption for federal legislation
adopted to enforce the Reconstruction Amendments. We conclude
that the answer should be "yes," both as a matter of the case law
and as a matter of federalism values, but also suggest that the task
of delineating a clear and workable exemption will be a difficult
one.
Finally, in Part V we explore, with skepticism, the possibility of
an expressive justification for the anticommandeering doctrines
here described.

I.

FIVE LINES OF DEMARCAT.ION IN SEARCH OF A RATIONALE

A. DOCTRINE: LINES OF DEMARCATION

In dissenting from the Court's 1985 decision to cease enforcing
state sovereignty constraints on the national government, Justices
O'Connor and Rehnquist each announced a hope and expectation
that the Court would return to the fray. 9 In fact, federalism doctrine was reinvigorated six years later when Grego1y v Ashcroft introduced a "plain statement rule" 10 for congressional action that
interferes with "the authority of the people of the States to determine the qualifications of their most important government officials."" But it was not until the next year, in New York v United
States, that the Court actually held a federal statute unconstitutional on federalism grounds.
In New York, the majority invalidated one part of a federal
scheme seeking to induce states to make provision for the disposal
of low-level nuclear waste, and sustained two others. The Court
drew a line of demarcation between legitimate conditional exercises of the federal spending or preemption power, on the one
hand, and illegitimate "commandeer[ing]," on the other. 12 The de9 Sec Garcia v Sau Antonio Men·opoliton Tramit Amb., 469 US 528, 580 (1985) (Rehnquist
dissenting); id at 589 (O'Connor dissenting).
10 501
452, 461 (1991).
11
Id at 463. The scope of the plain statement rule has proved elusive. Compare City of
Edmonds v OxfrmJ House, Inc., 514 US 725, 732 n 5 ( 1995) (land use regulation was not" 'a
decision of the most fundamental sort for a sovereign entity'") (quoting Gregory v Asbcroft,
50 1 US at 460) with BFP v Resolution Trust Corp., 51 1 US 531, 544 n 8 (1994) ("essential
sovereign interest in the security and stability of title to land" triggered plain statement
rule). The Court's optnion in Yeskey, discussed below, does not clarify matters.
12
505 US at 161 ("Congress may not simply commandeer the legislative processes of
the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program")

us
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gree of justification or public necessity was held to be irrelevant;
commandeering was an irredeemable constitutional violation,
while conditional spending or preemption was per se consistent
with constitutional constraints. The New York Court drew a second
line of demarcation by affirming prior cases upholding the imposition of federal duties upon state judges; the Court reasoned that,
as a matter of the text of the Supremacy Clause, judicial officials
were peculiarly subject to federal demands. 13 Finally, the Court
suggested that the prohibition on federal commandeering would
not cover "generally applicable" statutes. 14
Two Terms ago, in Printz, the Court went one step further. It
applied the prohibition on commandeering not only to federal
statutes which mandated policy-making by legislative officials, but
to the Brady Act, a federal statute that merely imposed on state
law enforcement officials the obligation to "'make a reasonable
effort' " 15 to determine whether certain pending firearm purchases
would be illegal. Printz reiterated the suggestion that statutes of
general applicability fell outside the coverage of the anticommandeering principle. 16 The Court reaffirmed that this principle did
not apply to statutes imposing federal duties on state judges, and
clarified that any state official performing judicial functions was
also subject to commandeering. 17 And the majority in Printz did
not take issue with the proposition, articulated by the dissent, 18
that Congress could induce action by state officials through conditional federal spending or preemption. 19
(internal quotation omitted); sec id at 161-69 (distinguishing between commandeering and
conditional spending or preemption).
IJ Sec id at 178-79.
"Id at 177-78.
11

117 S Ct at 2369 (quoting Brady Act).
See id at 2383.
11
See id at 2371, 2381 and n 14. It probably would be unwarranted to conclude that
every directive to state judges and state officials exercising a judicial function, otherwise
within Congress's Article I powers, is constitutionally permissible. See, for example, HI!Wiett
v Rose, 496 US 356, 372 (1990) ("The requirement that a state court of competent jurisdiction treat federal law as the law of the land docs not necessarily include within it a requirement thar the State create a court competent to hear the case in which the federal claim
is presented"). However, Prnuz and New York clearly exempt judges and state officials exercising a judicial function from the generic prohibition on commandeering.
IS See id ar 2396-97 (Stevens dissenting).
19 The majority opinion itself seems expli citly to acknowledge the constitutional legitimacy of cooperative federalism programs in the course of its unitary executive discussion.
See id at 2378 n 12.
16
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Pennsylvania Dept of Cot-rections v Yeskry offered the opportunity
to clarify matters. The Court reviewed the applicability of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to the operation of a state
prison system. The Yeskry petitioners and amici argued before the
Court not only that the ADA failed the "plain statement" requirement of Ashcroft, but that application of the statute to prisons
would be at odds with Printz, since the statute imposed duties of
"reasonable accommodation" which could be far more intrusive
than the Brady Act. 20 A unanimous Court, however, saw no need
to reach the constitutional question.
justice Scalia's opinion took the position that even if a "plain
statement mle" applied, it was "amply met" by the terms of the
ADA. 21 The opinion went on to avoid the question whether the
ADA was barred by Printz, on the ground that the question had
not been raised before the lower courts. 22 Yeskey was, however, illuminating in one way. The opinion suggested more directly what
had been implicit in New Y01··k and Printz: the limits imposed by
those cases do not apply to congressional enactments rooted in
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 23
Thus, by the end of last Term, the Court had erected an enclave
of state sovereignty explicitly bounded by four lines of demarcation. In addition, as we will argue below, these four demarcations
presuppose a fifth, implicit distinction between federal preemption
and commandeering. A federal requirement will be judged per se
unconstitutional if:
1) the requirement commandeers state officials, rather than
merely preempting state law; and
2) it does so directly rather than as a condition for federal spending, or for nonpreemption of state law; and
3) the requirement is targeted at state officials, rather than being
generally applicable to state officials and private persons alike; and
4) tl1e officials commandeered are exercising legislative or executive ratl1er than judicial functions; and
5) the requirement is grounded in the Commerce Clause or
10
See Brief for the Petitioners 23-25; Brief Amicus Curiae of the Criminal Justice Legal
Foundation 23-24.
21 118 S Ct at 1954.

22

lJ

See id at 1956.
See id. See Part N for a discussion of the Section 5 exception.
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Congress's other Article I powers, rather than in the grants of
power to Congress in the Reconstruction Amendments.
A great deal turns on the placement of these boundaries. We
will suggest that they are both unclear and (with the exception of
the last) unjustified by the values of federalism that the Court has
invoked. We begin with a brief review of those values.
B. THE RATIONALES: THE VALUES OF FEDERALlSM

What are the arguable values of constitutional federalism? More
robustly, why might there be good reason to constitutionalize federalism guarantees and have these guarantees enforced by the Supreme Court/4 as in such recent cases as United States v Lopez, 25
Seminole Tribe of Florida v Florida, 26 City of Boerne v Flores, 27 and
the cases of most interest for us, New York and Printz? In this
Part, we briefly summarize the values or functions that enforceable
constitutional federalism might be understood to serve, with specific reference to the Court's own defense of this feature of our
constitutional system. This summary should not be taken as an
endorsement. Rather, our claim is conditional: on the assumption
that constitutional federalism does serve important values, those
values are poorly tracked by the anticommandeering doctrines set
forth in New York and further developed by Printz. The critique
of New York and Printz advanced here is an internal critique, which
assumes without endorsing the basic normative presuppositions
upon which those cases rest.28
What, then, are the presuppositions of the Court's federalism
cases and, more generally, of constitutional federalism? To begin,
14 For discussion of the values that constirutional federalism, and federalism doctrine,
arguably serve, see Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 Minn L Rev 317, 386-405
(1997); jackson, Ill Harv L Rev at 2213-28 (cited in note I); Deborah Jones Merritt, Tbe
Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: FederaliJ?n jo1· a Tbird Ctmtmy, 88 Colum L Rev I,
3-10 (1988); Michael W. McConnell, Fedemlism: Evaluati11g tbe Fou11ders' Design, 54 U
Chi L Rev 1484, 1491-1511 (1987); Andrzej Rapaczynski, F1"0m Sovereignty to Process: Tbe
]zwispntdence of Federalism afte·r Garcia, 1985 Supreme Coun Review 341, 380-414; David
L. Shapiro, Federalism: A Dialogue 75-106 (Northwestern U .Press, 1995). A critical survey
is provided by Edward L. Rubin and Malcolm Feele)•, Fedemlism: Srrme Notes on tl National
N1!11rosis, 41 UCLA L Rev 903 (1994).
IS 514 US 549 (1995).
16 51 7
44 (1996).
17
117 S Ct 2157 (1997).
18 For an cxrernal critique, see Rubin and Feeley, 4 1 UCLA L Rev at 903- 52.

us
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federalism might be justified in light of the geographic diversity
of one or more variable v; to which policy is appropriately responsive:29 the geographic diversity of citizen preferences, needs, or interests; or, alternatively, of physical, social, or economic conditions; or even, perhaps, of the ethical norms and goals that
undergird governmental policy. The simplest, static version of the
argument says this: the values of some v; are in fact different in
different geographic regions; these variations are significant, that
is, large enough to make different policies optimal for different
regions; therefore a governmental regime that permits policy to
vary by region, rather than requiring a single national policy, is
optimal. As the Court crisply stated in Gregory v Ashcroft, federalism "assures a decentralized government that will be more sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogeneous society." 30 The geographic diversity argument can also be put, more elaborately, in
dynamic rather than static form: if separate governments defined
by geographic region exist, then citizens will migrate to different
regions depending on, say, their needs, interests, or ethical views,
such that over time geographic regions characterized by different
values of some v; will emerge. The dynamic version of the geographic diversity argument is, in effect, the argument famously advanced some forty years ago by Charles Tiebout, and since developed at great length in the economics literature on federalism. 31
A different argument for federalism stresses governmental innovation rather than geographic diversity. 32 As with the diversity argument, the innovation argument can be formulated either statically or dynamically. The static formulation is that proposed by
Justice Brandeis in his oft-quoted dissent to New State Ice Co. v
Liebmann: "To stay experimentation in things social and economic
is a grave responsibility. . . . It is one of the happy incidents of
the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
29
See, for example, Friedman, 82 Mi1m L Rev at 401-02; Merritt, 88 Colum L Rev at
8-9; McConnell, 54 U Chi L Rev at 1493-94.
30
501 US at 458.
31
See Charles M. Tic bout, A Pm·e Tbeory of Local Expmditum, 64 J Pol Econ 416 (1956);
Rubin and Feeley, 41 UCLA L Rev at 918 n 62 (citing literature).
l2 See, for example, Asbcroft, 501 US at 458; Friedman, 82 Minn L Rev at 397-400;
Merritt, 88 Col urn L Rev at 9; McConnell, 54 U Chi L Rev at 1498-99; Shapiro, Federalism
at 138- 39.
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experiments without risk to the rest of the country." 33 The notion
here is that the efficacy of novel governmental policies is uncertain,
and thus that, quite apart from the geographic diversity of needs,
interests, and so on, it makes sense to create a mechanism by which
to test novel policies on a subnational scale. That way, policy testing occurs more quickly, and the harmful effects of poor policies
are confined to particular regions rather than spread nationwide.
One objection here is that state governments have an incentive
to underinvest in policy innovation, as compared with the federal
government, since each state realizes within its boundaries only a
portion of the benefits from successful innovation, but bears all
the costs of failure. 34 A partial response to this objection holds that
successful states will induce immigration (with concomitant benefits, such as tax dollars) by the residents or firms of less successful
states. Thus is delineated a dynamic version of the innovation argument for federalism which, like the different kind of dynamic argument proposed by Tie bout, has been popular among economists.35
Yet a third value arguably served by federalism is one that might
be termed "tyranny prevention." 36 It is this value that has figured
most prominently in the recent case law. As the majority in New
York explained:
[T]he Constitution divides authority between federal and state
governments for the protection of individuals. State sovereignty is not just an end in itself. Rather, federalism secures to
citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign
power. just as the separation and independence of the coordinate branches of the Federal Government serve to prevent the
accumulation of excessive power in any one branch, a healthy
balance of power between the States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either
front. 37
285 US 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis dissenting).
See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taki11g a11d Reelection: Does Federalism Promote l11710Vatio71? 9 J Lej,'111 Stud 593 (1980) (questioning, on various grounds, incentive of states to
innovate).
11 See Rubin and Feeley, 41 UCLA L Rev at 920-21 nn 68-69 (citing sources for and
against the thesis that interstate competition is beneficial).
ll
H

10
Rapaczinski argues at length that federalism serves a "tyranny prevention" function.
See 1985 Supreme Court Review at 380-95. For other scholarly accounts that, in name
or substance, defend a ryranny-prevention view, see Friedman, 82 Minn L Rev at 402-04;
Jackson, Ill Harv L Rev at 22 18-20; Merritt, 88 Colum L Rev at 3-7; McConnell, 54
U Chi L Rev at 1500-07.
11 505 US at 181 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
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Printz heartily seconded this line of argument: "This separation
of the two spheres [state and federal] is one of the Constitution's
strucrural protections of liberty." 38 The claim, very roughly, is that
the amount of tyranny in a unitary regime (that is, the total tyranny at the level of the national government) is greater than the
amount of tyranny in a federal regime (that is, the total tyranny
at the level of the national government plus the total tyranny at
the level of the state governments). Place to one side, for the moment, the interesting problem of how to make commensurate different kinds of tyranny, or tyranny at different levels of government. (For example, if the move from a unitary regime to a federal
regime weakens the hold of powerful interest groups on the national government, but creates compact states, each with its government dominated by a homogenous majority of in-state citizens,
has overall tyranny decreased or increased?) The more basic question is what one means by "tyranny." Broadly speaking, we suggest, "tyranny" can be understood as the unjustified responsiveness
of governmental policies, or actions, or decisions, to particular
groups or persons. 39
There are plausible arguments that constitutional federal ism
helps to mitigate tyranny so defined. In particular, we will take as
true the claim that constitutional federalism serves to reduce the
interest-group dominance that would obtain in a unitary regime,
because the collective-action problems that hinder political activity
18

117 S Cr nt 2378.

19 A

narrower definition of tyranny would require unjustified governmental responsiveness
to governancntal officials. Classically, of course, the "tyrant" was someone who held formal
office-indeed, was the head of state-rather than simply being a powerful person. But
the narrow~r definition entails that talk of the "tyranny of the majority," or of "interest
group tyranny," is confu_sed. We see no confusion here. These kinds of governmental pathologies, like classic tyranny, or "legislative tyranny" (the responsiveness of government
to the interests of lebrislators, such as their interest in entrenching themselves in office), or
"bureaucratic tyranny," are all instances of the same general phenomenon, namely, the
unwarranted control of government by powerful groups or individuals- whether those persons hold formal office or not.
Tyranny is, at a minimum, unjustified responsiveness to particular groups or persons,
not mere responsiveness; if, for example, it tru ly is the case that governments justifiably
give greater weight to the inte rests of citizens as opposed to noncitizens, that hardly counts
as "tyranny." We will not pursue the issue whctber further qualifiers are needed, e.g.,
"oppressive" or "liberty-infringing" unjustified responsiveness, because we tlo not think it
plausible that such qualifiers materially change our argument. See, for example, Part II.C.
(considering whether tyranny, as here defined, is more problematic when it ensues in govermnenral action rather than inaction).
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by diffuse, unorganized groups at the national level are less difficult
to overcome in the smaller world of state politics.40 We will also
accept, for purposes of our internal critique, the standard view that
constitutional federalism undermines tyranny in the narrower and
more traditional sense of "tyranny by national officials," whether
legislators, bureaucrats, judges, or the President.41 We do find it
quite implausible that constitutional federalism reduces tyranny
along all dimensions. For example, the claim that (1) the national
government is more likely than state governments to be dominated
by a majority of the citizenry, to the detriment of the minority,
is in obvious tension with the claim that (2) the national government is more likely than state governments to be dominated by
well-organized interest groups, to the detriment of the majority.
This returns us to the problem, alluded to above, of how to make
commensurate different kinds of tyranny. Rather than take a stance
on that problem, we will generally advance a critique of Printz and
New York that is robust across different methods of commensuration, and across the different types of tyranny (interest-group tyranny, official tyranny, and others) that constitutional federalism
might possibly mitigateY
The final value arguably served by constitutional federalism is
one that we shall term "political community." 43 It is a shibboleth
of the literature endorsing federalism that states facilitate a kind
or degree of political participation by citizens that does not occur
at the national level. 44 We will assume that (a) democratic politics
(including citizen involvement) has intrinsic value or importance,45
and (b) the realm of state politics, if and only if adequately protected by the right sort of constitutionalized federalism guarantees,
<m See
41

Rapaczynski, 1985 Supreme Court Review at 386-88.

See id at 388-91.
41 But see Part Ill. C.
41 T he Court did not rely upon the value of political community in Primz and New York,
but it did do so in another case that figures importantly in current federalism jurisprudence,
Gngmy v Asho·oft. See Ashcroft, 501 US at 460-64.
44
See, for example, Friedman, 82 Minn L Rev at 389-94; Jackson, Ill Harv L Rev at
2221; Merritt, 88 Colurn L Rev at 7-8; McCoMell, 54 U Chi L Rev at J 507-I I; Rapac-tynski, 1985 Supreme Court Review at 395-408; Shapiro, Federalism at J 39; S. Candice Hoke,
Preemption Pathologies and Civic Republican Values, 7 1 BU L Rev 685, 701-14 (1991).
45
See Matthew D. Adler, Judicial Restraint in the Administ.-ative State: Beyond the Counternrajoritarian Difficulty, 145 U PaL Rev 759, 796- 806 ( 1997) (elahorating this idea).
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can realize this intrinsic value in a manner, or to a degree, that a
unitary regime cannot.46
II.

PREEMPTION VERSUS COMMANDEERING: THE BACKGROUND
DEMARCATION

Printz and New York clearly adopt three lines of demarcation: (1) between coercive directives to state officials, on the one
hand, and "cooperative federalism" statutes (conditional spending
or preemption) on the other; (2) between coercive directives to
state officials exercising a legislative or executive function, and coercive directives to state officials exercising a judicial function; and
(3) between targeted coercive directives to state legislators or executives, and coercive directives that are generally applicable both to
state officials and to private persons. In addition, the Supreme
Court, in cases prior to New York and Printz, as well as in the
Yeskey decision, has articulated a fourth demarcation line: (4) between coercive directives to state officials that are promulgated by
Congress pursuant to its ordinary Article I powers, and coercive
directives promulgated pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the parallel enforcement provisions in the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.47
Do these four demarcations together define the Court's new
state sovereignty jurisprudence? We think not. The four lines of
demarcation just described are, we believe, overlaid upon a fifth
and much more basic one: the demarcation between preemption and
commandeering. Printz and New York barely recognize this point.
Nonetheless, we shall now claim, those decisions are best interpreted, in the context of wider case law, as standing for the proposition that the federal government may impose certain duties on
state officials, even though the officials are nonjudicial, even
though the duties are coercive and targeted in the strongest sense,
-14The first assumption, (a), makes the concept of "political community" stronger than
and distinct from the weaker view that democratic politics has merely instrumental importance in increasing the quality of governmental outc()mes. We take it that the proponentS
of "political community" mean to endorse the stronger view. Indeed, if state politics is
construed to have merely weak, instrumental si!,''nificance, then the line between the political-community value of federalism and the others discussed above, particularly tyranny prevention, becomes quite blurred. Presumably, the main instrumental (outcome-enhancing)
as opposed to intrinsic role of democratic involvement is to reduce certain kinds of tyranny:
interest-group dominance as well as official entrenchment.
47
See PartS ill, IV (discussing these four demarcations).
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and even though federal action is grounded merely upon the Commerce Clause or another Article I power rather than upon the Reconstruction Amendments.48
In this Part, we defend this interpretive claim. Then we discuss
how the preemption/commandeering distinction should be fleshed
out. Our suggestion will be that the distinction is most plausibly
and sympathetically construed as a distinction between inaction
and action-between the negative duties that (albeit targeted, coercive, and directed to nonjudicial officials) are a permissible accompaniment of the federal power to preempt, and the affirmative
duties that are not. Finally, we argue that the preemption/commandeering distinction, even when construed in this plausible and
sympathetic way, is not strongly justified by the values of constitutional federalism.
A. IS THERE A PREEMPTION/COMMANDEERING DISTINCTION?

The federal government, where acting within the scope of its
authority under the Commerce Clause and the other powers set
forth in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, has the power to
define the legal positions of private parties: to accord private parties federal rights, duties, liberties, powers, liabilities, and other
legal positions, and to nullifY the state-law rights, duties, etc. that
physically or logically conflict49 with the federal positions.50 As the
Court has explained:
43 For a dramatic, recent failure to understand this point, see C(J11don v Reno, 155 F3d
453 (4th Cir 1998), where the Court invalidated the Driver's Privacy Protection Act-which
merely required state motor vehicle departments to refrain from disclosing information in
motor vehicle records-on the grounds that the Act was neither generally applicable nor
an exercise of Congress's Section 5 power and was therefore unconstitutional under New
York and Printz. By contrast, the courts in Oklnhomo v United Stntes, 161 F3d 1266 (lOth
Cir 1998) and Travis v Reno, 163 F3d 1000 (7th Cir !998) upheld the Act against the claim
th.at it impermissibly commandeered state governments.
49
"Physical conflict" is meant to cover the case where it is physically impossible for
persons to comply with both federal- and state-law positions, e.g., where federal law imposes
a duty to perform action A and state law imposes a duty to refrain from action A. "Logical
conflict" is meant to cover the case where having the federal position entails- as a matter
of the logic of Hohfeldian positions-that the person nor have the state law position, e.g.,
where federal law grants a liberty to perform A , and state law imposes a duty to refrain
from A. Stephen Gardbaum, in a recent, revisionary piece on preemption, agrees that the
federal government has the power to override state law in both cases of conflict, but would
(in effect) place the case of physical conflict under the Supremacy Clause and the case of
logical conflict under the Necessary and Proper Clause. See The N11ture of Preemption, 79
Cornell L Rev 767 (1994).

so More precisely, it is unquestioned that the federal government has the power to define
the federal positions of private persons, and to preempt conflicting state-law positions, just
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A wealth of precedent attests to congressional authority to ·
displace or pre-empt state laws regulating private activity affecting interstate commerce when these laws conflict with federal law. Moreover, it is clear that the Commerce Clause empowers Congress to prohibit all-and not just inconsistentstate regulation of such activities. Although such congressionaJ
enactments obviously curtail or prohibit the States' prerogatives to make legislative choices respecting subjects the States
may consider important, the Supremacy Clause permits no
other result. 51

These propositions are explicitly endorsed by Printz and New Yo·rk,
and understandably so/1 to deny them would be to eviscerate the
Supremacy Clause and two centuries of precedents.
Note, however, that the unquestioned power of the federal government to define the legal positions of private parties, and to preempt conflicting state-law positions, does not entail a federal
power to define or change the legal positions (particularly the leg~!
duties) of state legislators and enforcement officials. In theory, it
is possible to imagine a regime of constitutional federalism in
which the federal government has the power under the Commerce
Clause (1) to define the legal positions of private parties, and (2)
to impose a duty upon federal officials to respect, support, or enforce the rights, duties, etc. of private parties, as defined by the
federal government, and also (3) to impose a duty upon state
judges and adjudicators to respect, support, or enforce the rights,
duties, etc. of private parties, as defined by the federal government,
insofar as the federal positions of private persons do not entail duties by state officials.
Obviously, it is not unquestioned that the federal government can give private persons a
claim-right against smte officials.
II Hodel v v;rginia Smface Mining & Rec/amatio11 1/ss'n, inc., 452
264, 290 (1981) (citations omitted).
12 See New York, 505 US at 178 ("The Constitution ... gives Congrc:ss the authority to
regulate matters directly and to pre-empt contrary state regulation"); Printz, I I 7 S Ct at
2374 (stating that "all state actions [obstructing federal law) are ipso ft1cto invalid" and citing
Silkwood v Km·-McGee Corp., 464 US 238 (1984), for the proposition that federal law preempt.~ conAicting state law). Sec also PERC v Mississippi, 456 US 742, 766-67 (1982) (stressing federal power to define legal positions of priv~te persons, and to preempt conAicting
state law); N11tiona/ League of Cites v Usery, 426 US 833, 840-45 (I 976) (same, but also
distint,ruishing between federal power over private persons and federal power over states
them~elves), overruled, Gtmia v Sa11 Amonio Met:ropolitan Tmnsit Auth., 469 US 528 (1985);
Fry v United St11tes, 421 US 542, 552 (1975) (Rehnquist dissenting) ("Congress may preempt state regulatory authority in areas where both bodies are otherwise competent to act.
But this well-recognized principle of tbe Supremacy Clause is traditionally associated with
federal rct,rulation of persons or enterprises, rather than with federal ret,rulation of the State
itself. ...").
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but not the power to impose any duty at all 53 upon nonjudicial state
officials. That is, it is in theory possible to imagine a constitutional
regime in which, notwithstanding the federal power to define the
legal position of private parties, state legislators and enforcement
officials would remain free to act as if federa l statutes had not been
enacted, and the only governmental officials who would incur duties in virtue of a federal statute (under the Commerce Clause)
would be federal officials and state judges and adjudicators. Indeed,
a regime of constitutional federalism without federal power to impose duties upon state officials is precisely what an earlier Supreme
Court endorsed in an 1861 decision, Kentucky v Dennison.54 As the
Dennison Court put it: "[W]e think it clear, that the Federal Government, under the Constitution, has no power to impose on a
State officer, as such, any duty whatever, and compel him to perform it." 55
Should Printz and New York be read as reintroducing the Dennison doctrine into constitutional jurisprudence-more specifically,
as reintroducing Dennison with respect to targeted federa l statutes
that are addressed to nonjudicial state officials, and that are
grounded upon the Commerce Clause or Congress's other Article
I powers? We think not. Note, to begin, that the Court, in PERC
v Mississippi-a state sovereignty case preceding Printz and New
York-specifically disavowed Dennison as "not representative of the
law today," and stated that the federa l power to define the legal
positions of private parties encompassed an ancillary power to impose some duties upon (nonjudicial as well as judicial) state officials: "[s]tate legislative [as well as] judicial decisionmakers must
give preclusive effect to federal enactments concerning nongovernmental activity." 56 More important, to read Printz and New York
as denying federal power to impose any targeted, coercive duties
on nonjudicial state officials would be to read them as undermining
the large and long-standing body of preemption case law in which,
time and again, the Court has either explicitly authorized or at
least not questioned the entry of declaratory or injunctive relief
against state enforcement officials, prohibiting the officials from
By "duty," here, we mean a lef:,ral, sanction-backed duty.
65 US 66 (186 1), overruled, Pumo Rico v Bmnstnd, 483 US 219 (1987).
lS 65 US at 107.
56 456 US at 761, 766.

Sl

54

86

THE SUPREME COURT RE VIEW

[1998

enforcing preempted state laws (specifically, state laws preempted
by federal law that is grounded in the Commerce Clause or another Article I power, and not in the Reconstruction Amendments), under threat of civil or criminal contempt. (Such a duty
of nonenforcement is clearly targeted; only state officials, not the
population at large, have the power to enforce state law. 57) To give
but one example, in Morales v Trans World Airlines, Inc., with Justice Scalia (the author of Printz) writing for the majority, the Supreme Court held that state guidelines governing airline fare advertising were preempted by the federal Airline Deregulation Act,
and sustained the district court's entry of that portion of a permanent injunction against the Attorney General of Texas which
obliged him not to enforce the preempted guidelines against the
airlines.58 The Court in Printz and New York surely did not intend
to call into question Morales and the numerous other cases like it.59
Indeed, a brief passage in Printz seemingly acknowledges that
the federal government, by virtue of the Supremacy Clause, does
have the power to impose targeted legal duties on state legislators
and enforcement officials, not merely state adjudicators. This acknowledgment comes in the course of the Court's discussion of a
passage from Federalist 27.
These problems (in Justice Souter's interpretation of the passage] are avoided, of course, if [the passage is] taken to refer
to nothing more (or less) than the duty owed to the National
Government, on the part of all state officials, to enact, enforce,
57
More precisely, only stare officials typically have the power to enforce state law in the
sense of bringing civil or criminal enforcement actions, or undertaking investigatory activi ties, in the name of the state. And in the cases referred to here, it is typically state officials
alone who arc made subject to the declaration or injunction enjoining enforcement. Sec
also South Carolina v Baker, 485 US 505, 514 (1988) (suggesting that federa l statute which
"seek[s] to control or influence the manner in which States regulate private parries" is not
"generally applicable") (internal quotation omitted).
18
504 US 374 (1992); see id at 380-82 (explicitly authorizing injunctive relief under Ex
parte Youug, 209 US 123 (1908)). for similar cases, sec, for example, Barnett Bank v Nelson,
517 US 25 (1996); Livadasv Bradsbaw, 512 US 107 (1994); Gade v Nat'/ Solid Wastes Managemem Ass'n, 505 US 88 (1992); Schneidewind v ANR Pipeline Co., 485 US 293 (1988); Capital
Cities Cable, /uc. v Crisp, 467 US 691 (1984); Shaw v Delta Air Lines, h1c., 463 US 85 ( 1983);
New Mexico v Mesrnlt7'0 Apacbe T1·ibe, 462 US 324 (1983); Washington v Washiugtou State
Conrmercial Passenge1· Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 44 3 US 658 (1979); Douglas v Seacoast P1'0ducts,
Inc., 431 US 265 (1977); Ray v Atlantic Ricbfield Co., 435 US !5 1 (1978);Joues v Roth Packiug
Co., 430 US 519 (1977); City of Burbank v Lockbeed Ai1· Terminal Inc., 411 US 624 (1973).

s• Surely, too, the Court did not intend to overrule the line of cases authorizing suit
under Section 1983 to enforce federal statutory rights. See Maine v Tbiboutot, 448 US I
(1980); Goldn1 State Transit Corp. v City of Los Angeles, 493 US 103 (1989).
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and interpret state law in such fashion as not to obstruct the
operation of federal law, and the attendant reality that all state
actions constituting such obstruction, even legislative acts, are
ipso facto invalid.60
This passage is hardly crystalline. But, interpreted in the context of
Morales and the preemption decisions that Morales epitomizes, the
passage should be understood to confinn the existence of a demarcation additional to those explicitly set forth by Printz and New York:
the demarcation between preemption and commandeering.
The question remains whether Congress has the power to impose targeted duties on nonjudicial state officials d irectly, or
whether instead it must always do so indirectly, via the federal
courts. On the "indirect" view, Congress can pass a statute changing the legal position of private parties, but until a federal court
imposes concomitant duties on state offi cials through some kind
of judicial directive, those officials remain free to act as if the federal statute had never been enacted. Surprising as this view might
seem, there is real textual support for it in a passage from the New
York opinion:
Additional cases cited by the United States [to demonstrate
the federal power to issue directives to state governments] discuss the power of federal courts to order state officials to comply
with federal law. Again, however, the text of the Constitution
plainly confers this authority on the federal courts, the "judicial
Power" of which "shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity,
arising under this Constitution .... " The Constitution contains
no analogous grant of authority to Congress. Moreover, the
Supremacy C lause makes federal law paramount over the contrary positions of state officials; the power of federal courts to
enforce federal law thus presupposes some authority to order
state officials to comply.
In sum, the cases relied upon by the United States hold only
that federal law is enforceable in state courts and that federal
courts may in proper circumstances order state officials to comply with federal law, propositions that by no means imply any
authority on the part of Congress to mandate state regulation. 61
60
11 7 S Ct at 2374. The language from Ntw York discussed immediately below, see 505
US at 179, also constitutes a recognition by the Court that at least some federal governmenta l entities-namely, the federal courts-can impose certain duties upon nonjudicial state
officials.
61 505 US at 179 (citations omitted). This language, in tum, seems to trace back to justice
O'Connor's opinion in FERC v Missimppi. See 456 US at 784 n 13 (O'Connor concurring
in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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What is striking here is both the Court's distinction between judicial and nonjudicial federal directives, and its failure to describe
any category of directives that federal bodies other than the federal
courts can issue to state (legislative and executive) officials. One
of the Court's tasks in future federalism cases will be to provide
a definitive gloss on this language from New Y01··k, and a definitive
answer to the problem of direct versus indirect duties.
Our own conclusion is that Printz and New York, together with
other existing lines of federalism cases, are best interpreted as rejecting the indirect view. Congress can, we think, directly issue
preemption commands to state legislators or executives and back
up such commands with the threat of civil or criminal sanction,
quite apart from the power of the federal courts (acknowledged in
New York) to do so. Consider the substantial body of federal criminal law applicable to state officials, and the multiple Supreme
Court cases upholding the prosecution and conviction of state officials pursuant to these statutes.62 The indirect view would eviscerate or at least gravely disrupt this jurisprudence. Or consider the
well-established doctrine that, where a preempted state law has
wrongly been enforced by the state, injured parties may sue for
damages under Section 1983.63 The indirect view would require
that state officials or state subdivisions never be made defendant
to such suits, at least prior to a judicial injunction, declaration, or
other directive against them. 64
In sum, New York and Printz are best interpreted, in the wider
context of relevant case law, to mean the following: Congress can61 A recent example is Salinas v United States, 118 S Ct 469 (1997). As the Court has
explained: "IT]he cases in this Court which have recognized an immunity from civil suit
for state officials have presumed the existence of federal criminal liability as a restraining
factor on the conduct of state o fficials." United Swtes v Gillock, 445 US 360, 3 72 (1980).
61 See Golden St11te Tmnsit Corp. v City of Los Angeles, 493 US 103 (1989).
M A further, significant piece of evidence is the Court's opinion in p,.intz itself, which
fails to mention NI!W Y01·k's distinction hetween federal judicial and non-judicial directives.
Finally, as a matter of constitutional interpretation, the indirect view seems tenuous. The
power to issue a sanction-backed directive is hardly a uniquely judicial power, at least where
the directive is issued to a class of persons ("all state law enforcement officers," etc.), rather
than a named individual. The Court's reasoning in the passage from NI!W Yo,.k implies the
conclusion that a federal stature that is addressed to private persons, and that other.visc
lies within Congress's Article T powers, cannot be accompanied by a penalty provision
threatening chose persons with sanction for noncompliance. But since this conclusion is
clearly wrong-since, in truth, there is nothing uniquely judicial about the "authority to
order [persons) to comply" with federal law- then there is no Article In basis for reserving
to the federal courts che unique power to direct compliance by state officials.
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not commandeer either state legislators or state executive officials,
but it can directly impose some targeted, coercive duties on state
executive officials and state legislators6s pursuant to its power to
define the legal positions of private persons. This leads us to the
next question: What kind of targeted, coercive duties for state officials are permissible under New York and Printz, and what kind
constitute impermissible commandeering?
B. NEGATIVE VERSUS AFFIRMATIVE OUTU:S

Existing scholarship on Printz and New York has tended to assume, without much discussion, the proposition for which we have
just argued at some length: that the federal power of preemption
includes a power to impose certain duties on state officials. Moreover, existing scholarship bas tended to assume, without argument,
the separate proposition that the category of permissible duties are
negative duties, duties of inaction, as opposed to positive duties,
duties of action. 66 Notably, however, the Court in Printz and New
York does not articulate an action/inaction distinction-not surprisingly, given the Court's failure to confirm, with any clarity, the
more basic and logically prior demarcation between commandeering and preemption. We agree with other scholars that the
commandeering/preemption distinction is most plausibly and sympathetically fleshed out in terms of (some version of) the action /
inaction distinction. But a fa ir bit of conceptual, interpretive, and
normative work is required to accomplish the mapping from preemption onto negative duties, and from commandeering onto affirmative ones.
Let us begin with a paradigm. Paradigmatically, Congress may

61
Although the Court in Tenney v Brandhove, 341 US 367 ( 1951), and irs sequelae, see
Bogan v Scott-Harris, 118 S Ct 966 (1998); Supmne Court of Va. v Co11smners Union, 446
US 719 (1980); Lolce Co1mtry &totes, Inc. v Tahoe Regional Pla1111ing Agency, 440 US 39 1

(1979), has repeatedly held that state legislators arc absolutely immune from suit under
Section 1983, we take it that this immunity is statutory, not constitutional. Congress can,
under the rubric of preemption, impose duties upon state legislators as well as executive
officials. Sec United States v Gillock, 445 US 360 (1980) (finding no state legislative immunity
in federal criminal prosecution). Notably, the Court in Primz tOok great pains to deny the
import of the legislator/executive distinction, see 117 S Ct at 2380-81, and nowhere suggested that the scope of duties constitutionally imposablc upon state executives was wider
than that imposablc upon legislators.
66
Sec jackson, Il l Harv L Rev at 2201-02; Ilills, 96 MichL Rev at 870-71; Caminker,
1997 Supreme Court Review at 235-36 (all ci ted in note 1).
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oblige state executive officers not to enforce a statute or regulation
that creates duties for private persons-this is what is at stake in
garden-variety preemption cases-and, we take it, Congress also
has the constitutional power to require state legislators (or state
agency officials with rule-making power) not to enact a state statute or regulation that creates duties for private persons.67 For
short, we'll call this the "Preemption Paradigm." Conversely, the
federalism doctrine set forth in Printz and New York prohibits
Congress from.obliging state officials to enact or enforce a statute
or regulation that creates duties for private persons. As the Court
explained, in the concluding paragraph of the Printz opinion:
We held in New York that Congress cannot compel the
States to enact or enforce a federal regulatory program. Today
we hold that Congress cannot circumvent that prohibition by
conscripting the State's officers directly. The Federal Government may neither issue directives requiring the States to address particular problems, nor command the States' officers, or
those of their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a
federal regulatory program.68

For short, we'll call this paradigmatic case of impermissible federal
duties the "Commandeering Paradigm." What is the distinction
between the duties imposed upon state officers in the Preemption
Paradigm, and the duties imposed upon them in the Commandeering Paradigm?
Some apparent distinctions either are implausible or fail to sort
between the two paradigms at all. For example, although Printz
and New York repeatedly state that Congress may not "compel the
States to enact or enforce a federal regulatory program," or words
to that effect,69 there surely can be federal statutes that do not
literally do that-that do not require state officers to enact or enforce duties for private persons-but nonetheless constitute impermissible commandeering. Imagine a federal statute (backed by the
67

See note 65 (discussing legislative immunity).
117 S Ct at 2384.
69 See, for example, Printz, 117 S Ct at 2369 ("the Brndy Act purports to direct state law
enforcemem officers to participate ... in the admi nistrati on of a federally enacted re1,rulatory
scheme"); id at 2380 ("[New Yo·rk involved] a federnl statute that ... required the States
to enact or administer a federal regulatory program''); id at 2383 (" ' [t]he Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program' ")
(quoting New York, 505 US at 188).
611
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threat of sanctions for noncomplying states or state officials) that
unconditionally requires the state to enact and administer an entitlement program, rather than a program of regulation. We doubt
that the Court would uphold a federally required entitlement program of this kind. There is no connection, even an apparent or
intuitive one, between federalism values and the regulation/entitlement distinction.70
A second distinction between the Preemption Paradigm and the
Commandeering Paradigm that can quickly be rejected is the distinction between federal duties that negatively affect the level of
state resources and those that do not.1 1 For this distinction fails
even to observe the boundaries between the two paradigms. Some
cases that fall within the Commandeering Paradigm will have very
little resource impact, if any, upon the state-consider a federal
requirement that the state legislature simply enact a particular
duty-creating law, with this law to be implemented by private suit
rather than official prosecution. Conversely, cases that fall within
the Preemption Paradigm-most obviously, the federal preemption of state taxes72-can diminish state resources considerably.
A third unworkable distinction between the Commandeering
Paradigm and the Preemption Paradigm is the distinction between
a federal requirement that obliges the state to depart from the status quo, and a federal requirement that does not. The problem
here is defining the state of affairs that constitutes "the status quo"
in a way that is noncircular and nonarbitrary and yet observes the
boundary between the two paradigms.73 Why not say that the state
of affairs in which the state enacts and enforces a regulatory program is the status quo, and thus that the Commandeering Paradigm requires no state departure from this baseline? Clearly, to
say that the status quo cannot involve federal commandeering
70
See Printz, 117 S Ct at 2370-71 (distinguishing early federal statute that required state
courts to record applications for citizenship, and similar statutes, with reference to judicial/
nonjudicial demarcation, not by exempting entitlement commandeering from scope of anticommandeering rule).
71
See National League ofCities v Usery, 426 US at 846 (relying, in part, on substantial costs
imposed by Fair Labor Standards Act upon states and subdivisions to justify invalidating the
statute), overruled, Garcia v San Antonio Metropolitan Tmnsit Auth., 469 US 528 (1985).
11 See, for example, Aloha Airlines, Inc. v Director of Taxation, 464 US 7 (1983).
11 For a discussion of various possible definitions of the status quo baseline, see Seth F.
Kreimer, A/Jocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U Pa
L Rev 1293, 1351-74 (1984).

92

THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW

[1998

would be viciously circular; we are here trying to define commandeering by reference to the status quo. AJternately and noncircularly, one might define the status quo as (a) the state of affairs that
would have ensued, absent federal intervention, or (b) the state of
affairs that the federal government is authorized to effect or aim
at, consistent with its constitutional powers (and with individual
rights), apart from the anticommandeering doctrine. But using
baseline (a) means that only a subset of otherwise-constitutional
commandeerings covered by the Commandeering Paradigm-the
subset where the commandeered regulatory program is one that
the state itself would not have enacted, absent federal intervention-are unconstitutional. And using baseline (b) means that no
otherwise-constitutional commandeerings covered by the Commandeering Paradigm are unconstitutional (in short, that the
anticommandeering doctrine does no constitutional work at all).
This leads us, finally, to the action/inaction distinction. At the
outset, we stress that the distinction is a contested one. What, precisely, makes some person's (or some official's) behavior an "action," as opposed to a mere failure to act, has been and remains
a topic of considerable controversy in the philosophical literature. 74
But there are at least some philosophically respectable versions of
the distinction that will count the duty imposed upon state officials
in the Commandeering Paradigm as an affirmative duty- a duty
of action-and the duty imposed in the Preemption Paradigm as
a merely negative duty of inaction. For example, one prevalent
account construes the action/inaction distinction as a distinction
between physical movement and immobility. 75 On this account, it
is roughly the case that P "acts" just in case she moves her body
(P's body is voluntarily moved by P), and that otherwise there is
inaction or failure to act by P. And, indeed, one of the differences
between the Commandeering Paradigm and the Preemption Paradigm is the difference between movement and immobility. The
enactment and enforcement of a duty-creating statute does indeed
require physical movements by state legislators and enforcement
officers. Some state legislators must open their mouths or raise
their hands to vote "yea" for the statute; and state enforcement
14
See generally Jonathan Bennett, Tbe Act Itself (Clarendon, 1995).
15 See, for example, M ichael S. Moore, Act and Cii111e: Tbe Pbi/osopby of Action and Its
lmplicatioiU /01' c,·iminal Law (Clarendon, 1993).
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officers must raise their pens, or touch their fingers to computer
keyboards, so as to issue arrest warrants, subpoenas, indictments,
and so on. By contrast, state officials can not-enact or not-enforce
a duty-creating statute by remaining entirely immobile. Note further that the movement/immobili ty distinction correctly categorizes the case of a federally required entitlement program as a case
of commandeering-at least where the entitlement (say, an entitlement to state monies) would not exist absent the enactment of a
statute or other positive law by the state, since once again the enactment of positive law requires physical movements by the
enactors.
So the action/inaction distinction (at least certain versions of it)
can do the conceptual work of sorting between the Commandeering Paradigm and the Preemption Paradigm. Further, the conceptual mapping from preemption onto inaction, and commandeering onto action, has some interpretive plausibility, given the
role that the action/inaction distinction has played in other parts
of the Court's jurisprudence-specifically, in defining the content
of constitutional rights. For example, in the DeShaney case, where
it denied a due process claim brought by an abused child whom
governmental social workers had failed to protect, the Court quite
clearly and definitively stated that the Due Process Clause generally imposes only negative duties on government officials, not affirmative duties. 76 There are also some textual hints in the state
sovereignty jurisprudence itself (although not much more than
that) that the preemption versus commandeering distinction does
indeed map onto inaction versus action. 77
Finally, we suggest that there is a plausible or apparent link between the action/inaction distinction, and at least some of the normative considerations undergirding constitutional federalism. Two
of the federalism values we described in Part 1-the value of tyranny prevention, and the value of political community-seem to
implicate, or plausibly implicate, the distinction. As for tyranny
prevention: just as there is considerable philosophical support for
the "deontological" view that the action/inaction distinction has
16

DeShnnty v Winnebago Co1mty Dept. of S«inl Services, 489 US 189, 195-97 (1989).
See FERC v MiSiissippi, 456 US at 762 -63 n 27, 765, 767-68 n 30 (noting pennissibility
of even certain "affirmative" federal obligations for stare officials); Printz, 117 S Ct at 23 74
(noting obligation of state officials "not ro obstruct" the operation of federal law).
17
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general moral significance/8 so it seems plausible that governmental action is worse than governmental inaction, and specifically that
tyrannical governmental action is worse than tyrannical governmental inaction. Indeed, this apparent link between action/inaction and the value of tyranny prevention underlies the Court's reasoning in De Shaney.
As for the value of political community, it seems plausible that
federal statutes compelling a particular subcategory of state action-a subcategory we shall call "authoritative utterances" -do
indeed infringe upon the state's functioning as a political community in a distinctive and emphatic way. By "authoritative utterance," we mean a law-producing action: an action by a state official
that is an instance of some legal power of hers to define legal
rights, duties, and other legal positions.19 Classic authoritative utterances include the legislative action of enacting a statute, the executive action of issuing a command (e.g., an order to produce
information, or an order placing some person under arrest), and
the judicial action of imposing a sanction upon, or issuing an injunction to, a particular person.
A requirement that state legislators enact a particular statute
seems, somehow, to be more of an interference with state autonomy than a requirement that they refrain from enacting a particular statute. For in the case of the affirmative requirement, there is
a discrete, authoritative utterance-the enactment of the statutethat the legislators have been compelled to produce. By contrast,
in the case of the negative requirement, it is not (or may not be)
true of any utterance that the legislators have produced, that it
was thus compelled. It is not (or may not be) true of any entry in
the set of legislative utterances (the Statutes at Large) that the legislators were obliged by external, federal compulsion to produce that
utterance. Similarly, it seems, a requirement that state executives
78
For an overview of the debate between deomologists and consequentialists, see Shelly
Kagan, Nomzative Ethics (\Vestview, 1998).
79
Notably, however, the starutc invalidated in Printz did not compel authoritative unerances; state officers were simply required to investigate the legality of gun sales. The " take
title" provision invalidated in New Y01·k did not compel authoritative utterances either, at
least insofar as that provision simply required the states to take physical possession of the
nuclear waste; however, since such possession, or "title" apart from possession, might lead
to judgments against the state, which the state would then be obliged to pay, "authoritative
utterances" were arguably involved in New Yo1·k. See 505 US at 154-55, 174-77 (quoting
and discussing "take title" provision).
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perform an authoritative utterance, of whatever lcind, intrudes
more sharply on political-community values than a requirement
that they refrain from such performance.
In short, we believe that there is a good conceptual, interpretive,
and normative case for construing the preemption/ commandeering distinction as a distinction between inaction and action. If
the Court is to craft a jurisprudence that prohibits commandeering, but permits the kind of fed eral duties for state officials
that the preemption case law has long recognized, then it should
define impermissible commandeering as a targeted, coercive duty
for state legislative or executive officials that requires action on the
part of the officials, and permissible preemption as a duty (perhaps
targeted, perhaps coercive, and perhaps addressed to nonjudicial
officials) that does not require official action. 8° For the remainder of
the article, both in this Part and in subsequent Parts, we use the
commandeering/preemption distinction and the action/inaction
distinction interchangeably. We shall now argue that the
commandeering/preemption distinction-even cashed sympathetically as action versus inaction- is not truly justified by the values
of constitutional federalism.
C. PR EEMPTION, COMMANDEERING, AND THE VALUES OF
CONSTITUTIONAL FEDERALISM

It seems clear that the preemption/commandeering distinction
has little to do with the first two federalism values we described
in Part I: the value of responsiveness to geographic diversity, and
the value of innovation. A federal statute requiring inaction by
state officers (permissible preemption) can dampen interjurisdictional policy variation, no less than a federal statute requiring official action (impermissible commandeering).81 Indeed, neither in
Printz nor in New York did the Court seek to defend the
10
There is, however, at least one way in which a straight action/inaction distinction is
too crude a construal of the commandeering/preemption distinction. Presumably Congress
can impose certain affirmative remedial duties upon state officials who breach their negative
federal duties. Some such remedial duties, albeit affirmative, will not (we assume) constitute
commandeering. See Golden State Transit Corp. v City of Lcs Angeles, 493 US 103 (1989)
(upholding Section 1983 damages action against city, for breach of statutory duties under
National Labor Relations Act). Undoubtedly, further refinementS to the basic distinction
between action and inaction will emerge if the Court explicitly adoptS that distinction and
persistS in the anticommandeering jurisprudenc-e.
81

See Caminker, 95 Colum L Rev at 1078-79 (cited in note 1).
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preemption/commandeering distinction with reference to the values of geographic diversity and innovation. Rather, those values
are appropriately protected (if at ail) through straight Commerce
Clause doctrine plus the doctrines governing the scope of Congress's other Article I powers. These doctrines curb national uniformity, and thereby protect the values of diversity and innovation,
by limiting the power of Congress to preempt or commandeer.
More plausibly, we have already suggested, there is a link between the preemption/commandeering distinction and the value
of political community. In the case of federal directives compelling
state actions-specifically, in the case of federal directives compelling authoritative utterances by state officials- there is a particular
utterance (a particular state statute, say) that the federal government has compelled the state to perform. That surely seems worse
for democratic self-governance than the case in which state officials merely have been compelled to refrain from certain utterances. Is it truly worse? We think not, and will now argue to the
contrary.
The political-community defense of constitutional federalism
rests upon the premise that it is intrinsically valuable for citizens
to participate in governance. Democratic procedures and institutions are premised to have intrinsic value, apart from their instrumental value in improving the quality of governmental outcomes.
It is further claimed that a federal regime (by virtue of the smaller
size of state governments) instantiates this intrinsic value more
fully than a unitary regime. How does commandeering undermine
that? Commandeering, it must be stressed, does not change the
participatory or democratic structure of state government. Although state legislators are now obliged to enact a statute, or state
executives are now obliged to issue a directive, it remains the case
that legislators are elected by majority vote at regular elections,
that executives either are elected themselves or appointed by
elected officials, and that state citizens retain whatever rights they
otherwise would have to learn about, comment upon, criticize, and
challenge the choices of state legislators and executives.
Rather, commandeering undermines self-governance by limiting
the set of options that state legislators and executives have. The
choice whether to perform the commandeered utterance is no
longer a choice that is open to the officials and, derivatively, the
citizenry; it is no longer a choice that is responsive to the exercise
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of electoral and other democratic rights by those citizens. But, of
course, the same is true of preemption. Preemption, too, limits
the choices of state legislators and executives, and in a precisely
complementary way. While commandeering reduces the official's
choice set from C0 (perform the authoritative utterance, not-perform the Utterance) to C1 (perform the Utterance), preemption reduces the choice set from C0 (perform the authoritative utterance,
not-perform the utterance) to
(not-perform the utterance). In
each case, some opportunity for state legislators, executives, and,
derivatively, the state citizenry to shape the content of state law
has been removed from them. 82
To put the point another way: the total corpus of state law is
defined both by the authoritative utterances that legislators and
executives perform, and by the utterances that legislators and executives refrain from performing. By coercing performances or refrainings, commandeering or preemption constrains the content of
state law and in that way reduces the extent to which state law
can be shaped by intrinsically valuable procedures or institutions,
thereby undermining the value of political community. But it is
not the case that this value is especially or asymmetrically undermined by commandeering.
Why not say that affirmative shaping and negative shaping are
differentially valuable-that the reduction of the state's choice set
from C0 to C1 diminishes political community more than the reduction of the choice set from C0 to C2? We think this claim indefensible. The intrinsic value of political community, such as it may
be, inheres in responsible decision making by state citizens, and
in associated virtues such as deliberation, dialogue, open-mindedness, and impartiality. Qua the opportunity for decision making,
there is no difference between the two reductions in choice sets.
To explain why affirmative shaping and negative shaping are differentially valuable, one would need to appeal, not to the intrinsic
value of decisionmaking, but to something else- say, the intrinsic
value, for a state citizen, of identifying with the community of state
citizens and its laws. The citizen identifies most strongly-or so
it might be claimed- with the utterances that her legislators and

c2

81 Professor Caminke r makes a similar point, id at 1077-78. In Pa n ID.A. we qualify
somewhat the claim that commandeering diminishes choice, but the qualification applies
symmetrically to preemption.
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executives have performed, not the utterances that they have refrained from performing. Therefore, compelled performance interferes with political community more gravely than compelled refraining. But even if there is something like such an identification
value realized by political communities, apart from the value of
responsible decision making, we do not see why citizens ought to
identify with affirmative utterances (as opposed to the overall corpus of state law), nor do we know of any empirical work to demonstrate that they do in fact thus identify.83
Finally, we come to the fourth value of federalism, and the one
explicitly invoked in Printz and New York: tyranny prevention.
Both commandeering and preemption may be tyranny-enhancing,
along some dimensions, as compared to straight federa l or state
directives to private persons-we will not try to deny that herebut we do deny that commandeering is especially tyranny-enhancing, as compared to preemption.
Consider again the choice set we called C0: the choice between a
state official's performance of an authoritative utterance (or, more
generally, of an action) and her nonperformance of that utterance
(or, more generally, of that action). Let us assume that federalism
is tyranny-preventing, along a given dimension. That is, the federal
government's resolution of C0 is more likely to be unjustifiably
responsive to the interests of the given group (economic interest
groups, officials of the relevant government, a homogeneous majority of the relevant citizenry) than the state's resolution of C0•
If the federal government is permitted to decide whether the state
official should perform the action, then-we will imagine-that
decision is more likely to be tyrannical (in the given way) than a
simple decision by the state official, herself, whether to perform
the action. Why might this obtain? It might obtain because of the
kind of "accountability" considerations adduced by the Court in
Printz and New York.
[VV]here the Federal Government compels States to regulate,
the accountability of both state and federal officials is diminished .... [I]t may be state officials who will bear the brunt
SJ Indeed, we can readily imagine counterexamples to the claim that the state's authoritative utterances have a greater role in characterizing the state, and in fostering identification
(or disassociation) by state citizens, than state decisions to refrain from authoritative utterances. Imagine a state that refrains from proscribing marijuana use or assisted suicide, or
from regulating abortion.
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of public disapproval, while the federal officiaLs who devised
the regulatory program may remain insulated from the electoral ramifications of their decision. Accountability is thus diminished when, due to federal coercion, elected state officials
cannot regulate in accordance with the views of the local electorate in matters not pre-empted by federal regulation. 84

But, again, this is not an argument against commandeering, as
such, because both commandeering and preemption shift C0 from
the state level to the federal level. When federal officials preempt
a state statute, they can be confident-if the accountability story
is correct-that state rather than federa l officials will be held accountable for the nonenactment of the statute. Similarly, when
federal officials commandeer a state statute, they can be confident-foUowing the same story-that state rather than federal officials will be held responsible for the enactment of the statute.
Pace the Court's argument in New York, 85 we see no asymmetry
here. The choice between state action and state inaction may be
less accountable to the electorate, where that choice is directed by
a federal statute rather than resolved by state officials themselves,
but, if so, this is true whether the federal directive compels action
or inaction.86
What about the claim that tyranny is more problematic when
state action, as opposed to inaction, ensues? The defender of the
preemption/commandeering line might try to reformulate the
Court's accountability argument in New York and Printz; the point,
she might argue, is not that compelled state inaction is more likely
to be accountable to the electorate than compelled action, but
rather that unaccountable state inaction is simply less troubling.
But is it really? To begin, it bears emphasis that the anticommandeering rule becomes nonsuperfluous just where it involves commandeered state actions that do not violate constitutional rights.
The federal statutes in Printz and New York did not coerce state
officials to perform actions that violated the First Amendment, the
Takings Clause, the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection
84

New York, 505 US at 168-69. See Printz, 117 S Ctat 2377.
See 505 US at 168-69.
86
For similar skepticism about t:he Court's accountability rationale, wit:h respect eit:her
to preemption/commandeering or to t:he cooperative federalism demarcation, see Caminker, 96 Colum L Rev at 1061-74; Hills, 96 MichL Rev at 824-30; jackson, Ill Harv
L Rev at 2200- 05 (all cited in note 1).
85
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Clause, or any other part of the Bill of Rights; if the federal statutes had commandeered rights-violating state action, the Court
would not have needed to invoke state sovereignty to justify invalidating those statutes. So the anticommandeering rule (in its nonsuperfluous portion) involves state action that lies within the zone
of permissible action sketched out by the Bill of Rights.
We doubt that state action, at least state action within this zone,
is more likely to produce significant harm to the interests or welfare of the citizenry, or of some portion thereof, than state inaction. To see the point, consider the harm to a person P that ensues
when P dies. We'll assume, arguendo, that a state government (in
some way) produces a graver harm toP's interests or welfare when
governmental officials intentionally and directly kill P than when
they merely fail to prevent P's death. Yet it violates the Bill of
Rights for the state government to intentionally and directly kill
P. 87 Conversely, where the state governmental action commandeered by federal statute is constitutionally permissible under the
Bill of Rights- and thus the anticommandeering rule comes into
play-we see no reason to think that such action is worse per se
for P than state governmental inaction. For example, state governmental inaction causes P's death when government fails to regulate
the polluters who emit carcinogens into the air that P breathes. 88 State
governmental action causes P's death when government prohibits
firms from selling P the medication that would cure the cancer.
Is P's death worse for him or anyone else when Congress requires
state governments to prohibit firms from selling P the medication
than when Congress requires state governments to leave the carcinogen-emitting polluters unregulated? We think not. 89
81
More precisely, it violates the Bill of Rights for state government to intentionally,
di rectly, and unjustifiably kill P. See Snc'l'lrmemo v Lewis, 11 8 S Ct 1708, 17 18 (1998) ("It
is ... behavior at the other end of the culpability spectrum [from negligence) that would
most probably support a substantive due process claim; conduct intended to injure in some
way unjustifiable by any government interest is me sort of official action most likely to rise
to me conscience-shocking level."). The qualification for justifiable killing, here, does not
materially change our argument. Arguably, a justifiable governmen tal killing of P is no
worse for him than a governmental failure to prevent his death. And even if this is not
true, me case o f a justifiable killing is a special one; direct and intentional killings by governmenr will generally violate the Bill of Rights. Indeed, insofar as the proponent of Pt·intz
and New Ym·k is focused on tyrannical governmental action - action unjustifiably responsive
to particular groups o r persons-such action will by definition be unjustified.
88

89

On inaction as causal, see Bennett, Tbe Acr Itself at 126-30 (cited in note 74).

What about the claim that, in general, commandeered state action causes serious welfilre setbacks, like death, illness, and poverty, while commandeered state inaction will cause
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Clearly, there are large, normative issues here that this article
cannot hope to resolve definitively.90 Someone who believes in the
asymmetry of governmental action and inaction is unlikely to be
persuaded otherwise by our brief discussion. The most we can really accomplish here is to clarify the normative issues raised by the
preemption/commandeering distinction. We suggest that the best
defense for that distinction rests upon the value of tyranny prevention, rather than the other federalism values of diversity-responsiveness, innovation, and political community. So the Court in
Printz and New York was correct to invoke d1at value, as opposed
to these other three. But the Court went astray in suggesting that
differential accountability could explain the distinction. Rather, the
claim would have to be that unaccountable action and unaccountable inaction are differentially problematic. And we have tried to
undermine that claim, insofar as it is relevant here. Federal commandeering, insofar as it compels state actions that do not violate
the Bill of Rights, is not more problematic, we think, than federal
preemption.91
less serious setbacks? Jf commandeered action and inaction are indeed equally accountable,
or unaccountable, as we ar1,rued above, we see no reason for this asymmetry.
It has been suggested to us that the anticommandeering doctrine is tyranny-reducing,
not in the short-run sense that particular acts of commandeering are particularly likely to
be unaccountable or problematic, but in the long-run sense that commandeering enfeebles
the states as institutions capable of resisting the national government. Given the host of
ways in which preemption and commandeering can symmetrically enfeeble states, for example, by diminishing interstate diversity, by reducing state options and the concomitant intrinsic value of state politics, or by diminishing srate resources, we are skeptical about this
long-run argument as well.
90
One standard philosophical justification for the action/inaction distinction, the one we
have just addressed insofar as it bears on Printz and Nao Yot·k, is that certain actions are
morally worse than parallel inaction. See, for example, Kagan, Nonnative Ethics, at 70-78
(cited in note 78). Another standard philosophical justification is that affim1ative duties are
more "demanding"-they interfere more with a person's own life plan-than negative duties. See, for example, Bennett, The Act Itself, at 143- 63 (cited in note 74). We doubt,
however, that this latter justification applies to governmental actors as opposed to private
individuals.
91
Professor Hills develops a different argt1ment for the preemption/commandeering distinction. The argument is subtle, but we take it that Hills, centrally, is willing to concede
the hann to federalism values caused by preemption. Rather, he claims, the commandeering
power is uniquely unnecessary for the attainment of national goals. Where Congress needs
state governments to act, it can purchase action through voluntary agreement with the
states; by contrast, intergovernmental bargaining is insufficient to secure warranted preemption, because states would "hold out" for large payments by the federal government. See
96 Mich L Rev at 855-900 (cited in note 1). We are not persuaded, at least insofar as this
differential holdout ar1,rument is meant to justify the doctrines set forth in Printz and Nao
York. First, Hills seems to equate commandeering with a federal duty to regulate, and preemption with a federal duty not to regulate. This is not correct, on our reading of Printz
and Nao Yo-rk; rather, commandeering equals a federal duty to act, and preemption equals
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THE ExPLICIT DEMARCATIONs: CoOPERATIVE FEDERALISM,
GENERAL APPLICABILITY, AND ADJUDICATION

In this Part, we discuss the three lines of demarcation between permissible and impermissible federal statutes that the
Court explicidy set forth in both New York and Printz and that
have been the main focus of scholarly writing in this area: the demarcations concerning cooperative federalism, general applicability, and adjudication. As we see it, these are demarcations within
the set of affirmative federal duties, since the federal government
may permissibly impose negative duties upon state officials as an
accompaniment to its power to preempt state law. Thus understood, the three demarcations-like the more basic and implicit
distinction between preemption and commandeering-are not justified by the values of constitutional federalism.
A. COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM

The cooperative federalism demarcation distinguishes between
so-called "conditional spending" or "conditional preemption" and
straight commandeering. Congress may not "compel" the states
a federal duty to refrain from action. If, for example, the federal government obliges a state
legislature to repeal on existi11g regulation, then that countS as commandeering- because the
legislature has been obliged to rake the action of repeal-on our understanding of the
preemption/commandeering distinction. (There is a possible refinement to the action/inaction interpretation mentioned in note 80, for affimlative remedial duties, but a federal duty
to repeal an existing regulation is not necessarily remedial; it might just be deregulatory.)
Why should there be lesser holdout problems in securing a state's repeal of an existing
regulation than in securing agreement not to enact the regulation in the first place?
Even leaving this point aside, we are not convinced by Hills's argument. Printz and New
York concern the federal power to impose duties upon state legislatures and executives, not
the federal power to impose duties upon (n) private persons, (b) federal officials, or (c) state
adjudicators. Call tbe regime in which the federal government only has the power to impose
duties upon (a), (b), and (c) the "Baseline Regime." What Hills needs to show, ro justify
Printz and New York, is that (1) the Baseline Regime must be supplemented by a federal
power to oblige state legislators and executives to refrain from action (paradigmatically, to
refrain from regulation), becau.~e of insuperable holdout problems otherwise; but (2) the
Baseline Regime need not be supplemented by a federal power to oblige state legislators
and executives to act, because of the absence of significant holdout problems here. We do
not think Hills bas demonstrated that, or even focused on the problem in this way. Note
that, in the Baseline Regime, state legislatures could enact regulations that conflict with
federal law, and stare enforcement officials could prosecute violators, but state and federal
adjudicators would not impose penalties on the violators. Further, the federal government
could enact irs own regulations and enforce them through the federal courtS. This is the
baseline from which the federal government would need to purchase state legislative or
executive action or inaction; relative to that baseline, we are not convinced that differential
holdout problems afflict rbe rwo kinds of purchases.
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to "enact or enforce a federa l regulatory program" 91 (on our interpretation, to perform actions), but it may "encourage" 93 the states
to do so, either by (1) making the payment of federal monies to
a state conditional upon the state's performance of the actions, or
(2) making nonpreemption of state law conditional upon the state's
performance of the actions. This demarcation was integral to the
holding of New York, where the Court struck down one provision
of the federal statute at stake, but upheld two others (corresponding to the two permissible subcategories of conditional spending
and conditional preemption); and it was implicitly reaffirmed by
the Court in Printz. 94
A fair bit of doctrinal work remains to be done in fleshing out
the precise content of the commandeering/cooperative federal ism
distinction. We take it that commandeering occurs where Congress induces state officials to perform actions by threatening a
sanction for nonperformance.95 The problem then becomes distinguishing between the impermissible threat of a "sanction" and a
permissible threat to terminate federal funding or initiate federal
preemption unless the action is performed. The Court's basic understanding of this distinction, at least the basic understanding that
emerges in New York, seems to be this: If Congress threatens state
officials with some outcome 0, conditional on their failure to perform the actions, where it would be unconstitutional for Congress to
impose 0 unconditionally, then that counts as commandeering. By
contrast, if Congress threatens state officials with some outcome
0', conditional on their fai lure to perform the actions, where it
would be constitutional for Congress to impose 0' unconditionally, that counts as permissible "encouragement."96 Conditional
spending and preemption statutes fall on the permissible side of
this demarcation (because Congress can unconditionally deny federal funds to the States, and can unconditionally preempt state
law). By contrast, the following cases, all of which seem intuitively
91

Printz, 117 S Ct at 2384.

9l

Nt!W York, 505 US at 166.

~

Sec notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
91 If the imposition of an affirmative but unenforced federal duty upon the states were
sufficient to constitute commandeering, the Court's frequent references to "compulsion"
and "coercion'' would be otiose. Sec, for example, Printz, 117 S Ct at 2371 n 2, 2375,
2379, 2383, 2384; Nw York, 505 US at 149, 161 , 165, 168, 174, 175, 188.
96

See, for example, Nw York, 505 US at 175-77.
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to be cases of commandeering, are indeed classified that way by
the basic test here described: (1) Congress threatens that, unless
the actions are performed, the state itself will be "fined," that is,
state tax dollars (untraceable to previous federal grants) will be
confiscated by federal officers;97 (2) Congress threatens that, unless
the actions are performed, state officers will be personally fined;
(3) Congress threatens that, unless the actions are performed, state
officers will be jailed.
Note, however, that this basic approach may need to be
amended if the anticommandeering doctrine is to have practical
significance. For, given the wide range of outcomes that Congress
can unconditionally impose, this approach seemingly enables Congress to circumvent the anticommandeering doctrine with ease.
Tbe problem of "unconstitutional conditions" looms, here as elsewhere in constitutional law. For example, what is to prevent Congress from making the payment of highway funds to the states
conditional upon state enactment of legislation restricting abortion, homosexual sodomy, and the possession of guns near
schools? 98 What is to prevent Congress from threatening that,
where a state fails to enact and enforce a particular program
to regulate nuclear waste, all waste-disposal laws (or all environmental laws!) in that state will be preempted?99 Either the
commandeering/cooperative federalism distinction will be refined
by the Court, such that certain action-inducing threats will count
as commandeering, notwithstanding the fact that the threatened
outcome could be imposed unconditionally; or, seemingly, the nocommandeering prohibition will become a formality. 100
We doubt that the Court will succeed in refining the
commandeering/cooperative federalism demarcation in a coherent
and workable fashion. In the area of conditional spending, there
97
See New York v United States, 326 US 572 (1946) (indicating that Congress cannot levy
tax falling only upon the States).
911
Sec, for example, South Dakota v Dole, 483 US 203 (1987) (upholding federal statute
that conditioned highway funds upon state adoption of 21 as the drinking age); Virginia v
81·owner, 80 F3d 869 (4th Cir 1996) (upholding federal statute that conditioned highway
funds upon acceptable state air-pollution plan).
90
See, for example, FERC v MissiS$ippi, 456 US at 764- 70 (upholding conditional-preemption statute, threatening sweeping preemption of state law).
100
See Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Pedem/ Spmding aftn· Lcpez, 95 Colum L Rev 1911
(1995) (discussing risk that Congress's conditional spending power may moot federalism
constraints on regulation).
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is in fact a refinement already on the books, one briefly mentioned
by the Court in New York: the so-called Dole test, which requires
that a spending condition be "germaneO,'' that is, "reasonably related to the purpose of the expenditure." 101 But the Court has
never, in fact, invalidated a conditional spending program for fa iling the "germaneness" requirement-in particular, it did not do
so either in Dole or in New York itself-and with good reason: the
germaneness requirement, in its current form, is vacuous. Consider
three possible conditions upon the granting of federal highway
funds to the state: (a) that the state maintain the highways in good
physical repair, (b) that the state raise the drinking age to 21, and
(c) that the state prohibit gun possession in school yards. Intuitively, the first condition is germane, the second (actually upheld
by the Court in Dote) is a boundary case, and the third is nongermane. But can the intuition be justified? To do so, we need a nonvacuous criterion for individuating purposes, one that the Court
has as yet failed to provide. The third condition is nongermane if
the purpose of the federal grant is "highway safety." But why not
say that its purpose is "physical safety," including both highway
safety and safety from gun violence? In theory, an individuation
criterion might require that a spending condition be germane to
the "maximally narrow" (but still constitutional) construal of the
purpose behind the spending program, apart from the condition.
Even assuming the notion of "maximally narrow" is coherent, it
is clear that this kind of criterion is much too restrictive to permit
the spending programs upheld in Dole or, for that matter, New
York. T he permissible purpose of "maintaining the physical condition of highways" is narrower than the purpose the Court needed
to invoke in Dole, namely, highway safety. So some lumping of
narrow purposes is permissible-but the Court has as yet provided
absolutely no clue as to the boundary between permissible and impennissible lumping.
As for the area of conditional preemption, the Court has yet
even to announce a doctrinal refinement analogous to the Dote
"germaneness" test-let alone a workable and coherent one. New
101
South Dakota v Dole, 483 US ar 208; New York, 505 US ar 172. The other part.~ of
the four-pronged Dole test are nor responsive to the problem of unconstitutional conditions
raised here. Although Dole further suggests that a spending starute satisfying the test might
nonetheless be unconstirutionally "coercive," see 483 US at 211, it gives no explanation
what that means.
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York simply stated that "where Congress has the authority to regulate private activity under the Commerce Clause, we have recognized Congress's power to offer States the choice of regulating
that activity according to federal standards or having state law preempted by federal regulation"; 102 and Printz added nothing to this
fonnulation. This unrefined formulation is problematic, as Professor Rick Hills has explained: "If there are no limitS on Congress's
power to use conditional preemption, then New York is a meaningless formality, because the national government could always require that state and local governmentS either make policy according to federal standards or disband themselves [i.e., have all
state and local law within the scope of federal power preempted]."103 Indeed, the Court in FERC v Mississippi, the pre-New
York decision from which conditional preemption doctrine sterns,
held that Congress could induce state electricity and gas regulatory
commissions to adopt certain federal policies by means of a sweeping threat of federal preemption. (fhe permissible threat was that,
if the commissions failed to adopt the policies, state regulation of
electric and gas utilities would be preempted.)
In sum, the constitutional permissibility of conditional spending
and conditional preemption threatens to make the anticommandeering rule of Printz and New Yo·r k a practical nullity. But even
on the assumption that the anticommandeering rule (as eventually
refined by the Court) turns out to be coherent, workable, and practically important, we propose a normative critique of the rule: like
the background demarcation between duties of inaction and duties
of action, the further distinction between state action secured
through commandeering versus state action secured through conditional spending or conditional preemption is a distinction poorly
justified in light of the values that lie behind constitutional
federalism.
Once again, the values of innovation and responsiveness to diversity can be dispensed with fairly quickly. Straight commandeering seems no more likely to produce national uniformity than
conditional spending or preemption. One might object that, because Congress must pay for uniformity when it purchases state
regulation, through conditional spending, the overall degree of
101
101

505 US at 167.
Hills, 96 Mich L Rev at 921 (cited in note 1).
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uniformity (or of unjustified uniformity) is lower than if both conditional spending and commandeering were permissible. Note,
however, that Congress funds its conditional payments to the
states through the taxation of resources that would otherwise be
available for state taxation and for the (geographically variable)
state programs that state taxation could fund; so the net effect of
conditional spending as opposed to commandeering on overall
uniformity is, at best, speculative. As for conditional preemption,
the cost for the federal government of converting a straight, sanction-backed directive to state officials into a directive backed by
the threat of preemption for noncompliance seems to be sufficiently low that the demarcation between conditional preemption
and straight commandeering cannot be justified on uniformity
grounds. t04
Here, as with the preemption/ commandeering distinction, it
strikes us that a more plausible argument for the Court's new jurisprudence of federalism rests upon the value of political community. Is it not the case that, when Congress compels state legislators or executives to perform an action-in particular, an
authoritative utterance-Congress has reduced the set of choices
available to those officials, derivatively to the state citizenry, and
has thereby diminished the intrinsic values of democratic participation and deliberation? By contrast, is it not true that, in the case
of a conditional spending or preemption program, the state's
choice set is simply shifted rather than reduced? Prior to the
threat, the choice set was (perform, not-perform); subsequent to
the threat, the choice set becomes (perform and receive monies,
not-perform) or (perform, not-perform and incur preemption). Is
there not less of an intrusion on the scope of state choice here
than with straight commandeering?
In responding to this objection, we will focus on the case of
conditional spending. (Our analysis carries over, mutatis mutandis,
to the case of conditional preemption; so as to avoid repetition,
we will not duplicate the analysis for that case, but rather leave
the details to the reader.) Technically, commandeering does not
reduce the state official's choice set. It remains physically possible
101 See Michael C. Dorf and Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democr11tic Experimenttllism,
98 Colum L Rev 267, 419-32 (1998) (arguing rhat conditional federal spending and preemption, like commandeering, threaten interstate variation).
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for the official to refrain from performing the commandeered utterance. But if the mandate to perform is backed by the threat of
a harsh sanction, to be imposed personally upon the official, then,
for purposes of political-community values, the effect on official
choice is virtually equivalent to a physical constraint. That is, the
choice for the official shifts from (perform, not-perform) to (perform, not-perform and go to jail) or (perform, not- perform and
pay a large personal fine). Given the large personal stakes for the
official, it is unlikely that she wi ll choose between the options in
a manner that advances intrinsic political values- by giving equal
weight to the interests of each citizen, with no special weight for
her own interest, and relatedly by sincerely responding to citizen
proposals and challenges framed in terms of the public good. As
the Court explained in the Spallone case, where it distinguished
between sa nctions directed at a municipality and personal sanctions directed against municipal legislators:
The imposition of sanctions on individual legislators is designed to cause them to vote, not with a view to the interest
of their constiruents or of the city, but with a view solely to
their own personal interests. Even though an individual legislator took the extreme position-or felt that his constiruents
tOok the eXtreme position-that even a huge fine against the
city was preferable to [complying with a federal court directive], monetary sanctions against him individuaiJy would motivate him to vote to enact the ordinance simply because he did
not want to be out of pocket financially. Such fines thus encourage legislators, in effect, to declare that they favor an ordinance not in order to avoid bankrupti ng the city for which they
legislate, but in order to avoid bankrupting themselves.
This sort of individual sanction effects a much greater perversion of the normal legislative process than does the imposition of sanctions on the city for the failure of these same legislators to enact an ordinance. 1os

Indeed, it would be unfair to ask that an official, faced with jail
or a large personal fine, sacrifice self-concern and thereby permit
the process of impartial public deliberation to carry on. Conversely, in the unlikely event that an official were to assume a superhuman attitude of impartial public spiritedness in the face of
grave personal threat, and treat that decision as no different from
101

Spallone v Uniud States, 493 US 265, 279-80 (1990).
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the ordinary decision C0 between (perform, not-perform), thenwe want to claim-the values of political community would not be
diminished.
Consider now a case of commandeering that does not involve
large personal stakes for the official decisionmaker. Congress directs state legislators, say, to enact a particular statute, and threatens to impose a $10 million fine-to be paid from the state treasury-for each year that the legislation is not in force for the entire
year. Let us call this the Fine Case. Contrast that with what we
shall call the Payment Case: Congress conditions a yearly payment
of $10 million to the state upon the statute's being in force for
the entire year. It is December 31. In the Fine Case, the state
legislator faces a choice between (enact the statute, not-enact the
statute and deplete the state fisc by $10 million). In the Payment
Case, a case of permissible conditional spending, the state legislator faces a choice between (enact the statute and receive a $10
million federal payment, not-enact the statute). One might say
that, in the Fine Case, "extraneous" considerations have been introduced into the pre-threat choice between (enact, not-enact),
and that the intrinsic value of the pre-threat choice has been diminished. We deny that this is true; the federal government, by
its own actions and utterances, constantly changes the effective
choice sets available to state legislators, and unless the federal actions and utterances are independently unconstitutional (say, under
ordinary Commerce Clause doctrine), we fail to see how their occurrence amounts to the introduction of "extraneous" or "valuereducing" considerations into state choice-sets. But even if it we·re
true, our point here is that precisely symmetrical considerations
are introduced into state deliberations in the Payment Case. The
state, in that case, no longer faces the baseline choice between (enact, not-enact), but the new choice between (enact and receive
funds, not-enact). The two cases differ only in this: in the Fine
Case, but not the Payment Case, the federal action in response to
the legislators' choice is not an action that the federal government
could take unconditionally. But we do not see how, from the perspective of political-community values, that bears on the value or
importance of state legislators having this choice to make.
The upshot of this analysis is that the doctrinal line between
commandeering and cooperative federalism fails to track the value
of political community. Commandeering, as such, no more under-
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mines state autonomy-specifically, it no more reduces the scope
and value of the choices open to state officials and state citizensthan conditional spending or conditional preemption. What does
(or may) track that value is a cross-cutting distinction-between
threats to the state itself, and personal threats to state officialsthat the Court has elsewhere recognized (as in Spallone) but specifically rejected in Printz. 106
Finally, with respect to the value of tyranny prevention, we concur in Professor Hills's analysis. As Professor Hills crisply puts it,
"[E]rosion of political accountability is endemic to all forms of
cooperative federalism." 107 Although cooperative federalism statutes and straight commandeering statutes may both reduce accountability, relative to ordinary federal or state statutes directly
regulating private persons, the demarcation between cooperative
federalism and commandeering cannot be justified in terms of
accountability. 108
B. GENERAL APPLICABILITY

In both New York and Printz, the Court intimated that the inflexible prohibition on commandeering would not extend to federal laws of general applicability. Some such distinction is necessary if the prohibition on commandeering is not to immunize
states and state subdivisions from Commerce Clause regulation
even more broadly than did the regime of National League of Cities,
which preceded Garcia and protected only integral state functions.109 An unlimited anticommandeering principle would preclude federal antipollution mandates for municipal trash haulers,
minimum wage requirements for state universities, or application
of environmental regulations to the furnaces of local police
stations.
The distinction between laws of general applicability and those
106
See I 17 S Ct at 2382 (declining to distinguish between federal statute directed at state
itself, and federal statute directed at state officers, at lcasr insofar as actions directed are
official).
107

Hills, 96 Micb L Rev at 828 (cited in note 1).
Nor, of course, can it be justified (a Ia De Shaney) in terms of the differential moral
significance of state action and state inaction, because, to reiterate, the very point of the
Court's exemption for cooperative-federalism schemes is to create a permissible mechanism
by which Congress can induce state officials to perform actions.
109 See Gonia, 469 US at 537 (summarizing National League of Cities regime).
1011
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which are directed at a protected area of state sovereignty echoes
other lines of demarcation drawn in constitutional law. The
Court's negative Commerce Clause doctrine is centrally focused
on the differential treatment of interstate commerce; 110 the Free
Exercise Clause, as currently construed, is almost exclusively concerned with discrimination against religious actors, and permits
their activities to be burdened by generally applicable laws; 111
"content discrimination" triggers heightened scrutiny under the
Free Speech Clause. 112 Indeed, in wrestling with the comparable
issue of state immunity from federal taxation, Justice Frankfurter
championed the position that the primary determination should
turn on whether the taxes were of general applicability. II)
But the easy availability of a doctrinal tool does not prove its
propriety. The exception for laws of general applicability harbors
both difficulties of definition and of justification.
First, the concept of "general applicability" is not pellucid. Is a
generally applicable statute simply one written broadly enough to
encompass private as well as public entities? In an era of rampant
privatization, it is hard to identify many governmental functions
that are not carried out by at least some private entities. A law
regulating "prisons" would encompass some public and some private entities; likewise a statute regulating "adjudicators." If the
Brady Act had applied to "entities with easy access to information
about criminal records," rather than "chief law enforcement officer[s]," 114 thereby including credit bureaus and private investigators, would that have saved the statute?
The Court could avoid such difficulties by identifying essentially
governmental functions: a federal statute targeting such functions,
even if it included some private actors, would then be taken as
falling within the scope of the anticommandeering prohibition. In-

110
See, for example, Camp Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v TUW71 of Hamson, 520 US 564
(1997).
111
See Employment Division v Smitb, 494 US 872 (1990).
111 See, for example, Boos v Barry, 485 US 312 (1988).
111 New York v United States, 326 US 572 (1946) (opinion of Frankfurter). See also M'Cullocb v Maryland, 17 US 316, 435-36 ( 1819); Soutb Carolina v Baker, 485 US 505, 514-15
(1988). It is somewhat awkward for the defender of Primz and New York to rely upon the
Frankfurter opinion in view of the fact that justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court in
National Ltagut of Citits disparaged it as lacking authority. See 426 US at 843 n 13.
114 See 117 S Cr ar 2369 (quoting Act).
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deed, Justice Scalia's opiruon in Printz steers toward this approach. 115 But distinguisrung between governmental and nongovernmental functions is a notoriously tricky business. The Court's
difficulties in specifying conceptually or historically "public" activities led to its abandonment of the line in intergovernmental tax
immunity cases, 116 and constituted one ground for abandoning National Leag;ue of Cities. 117 Printz itself hardly seemed to involve an
essentially governmental function; the chief law enforcement officers purportedly commandeered by the Brady Act were simply required to check their records.
In the alternative, the distinction might turn on whether the
federal regulation in question specifically identified the objects of
regulation as governmental actors. But here again difficulties
abound. The rule in Gregory v Ashcroft requires that when Congress seeks to include certain state activities in a regulatory scheme,
it must clearly so state. 118 D oes such a statutory statement make
the statute targeted rather than generally applicable? If not, then
what about a federal statute that covers both private and public
entities, but specifies different duties for the different players? 119
Or a statutory amendment that includes state officials in a scheme
that formerly excluded them? 120
Second, it is far from clear why a regulation of general application should be less problematic in terms of the standard federal ism
values than a targeted regulation. Commentators who are sympathetic to the anticommandeering principle acknowledge that the
Line between generally applicable and targeted laws is difficult to

111
See id ar 2383 n 17 ("The Brady Acr does nor merely require CLEOs ro reporr information in rheir privare possession. Ir requires rhem ro provide information rhar belongs ro
the State :md is available ro rhem only in their official capaciry; and ro conduct investigarion
in their official t'llpaciry, by examining darabases and records rhat only state officials have
access ro. In other words, the suggestion that extension of this statute to private citizens
would eliminate the constitutional problem posits the impossihle.").
110 See Gtwda, 469 US at 540-43 (discussing tax-immuniry cases).
111
See icl at 537-47.
118 Sec notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
119
See, for example, the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 USC §§ 12131 ct seq (1994)
(duties applicahlc to public entities); id §§ 12181 et seq (duties applicable to private entities
that operate public accommodations or services).
110
See, for example, Mmylnnd v Wirtz, 392 US 183 (1968) (upholding amendmenr to
Fair Labor Standards Act that removed exemption for certain government employers).
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defend. 121 An imposition uniformly applied to public and private
sectors can suppress innovation, impair responsiveness to geographic diversity, and so on, quite as effectively as one precisely
targeted at governmental entities.
Nor are more indirect arguments persuasive. The passage of a
generally applicable regulation, it might be argued, could signal
the existence of a national interest sufficiently important to justify
infringing whatever federalism values might obtain. But this argument overlooks the fact that the federal legal system regularly and
in wholly noninvidious circumstances imposes duties on public
entities that it omits for private parties. Public entities may not
discriminate against federally protected labor arrangements either
in their provision of benefits or in regulatory advantages; 122 private
entities may choose their own agendas. Persons acting "under
color of any [law) of any State" may be sued for violating federal
statutory mandates in circumstances where no comparable action
is available against private parties. 123 Extortion by public officials
constitutes a distinct crime. 124 A variety of considerations, ranging
from the unique ability of state officials to frustrate or further national policy, to a desire to acknowledge state priorities, to the
unwillingness of state courts to grant relief against public officials,
justify this special treatment.
Reciprocally, it could be claimed that generality of application
provides the protection of virtual representation; majorities and
powerful interests who must themselves live with the results of a
11 1
See Hills, 96 MichL Rev at 916-21 (cited in note I); Deborah jones Merritt, Republican GIJVmmzems and Autonomous States: A New Role fw the Gt1arantee Clause, 65 U Colo L

Rev 815, 826-27 and n 57 (1994) (arguing that concept of general applicability can be
linked to Guarantee Clause, but also stating that "a Supreme Court ruli ng based squarely
on the Guarantee Clause is preferable to one maintaining the distinction New Ywk suggested between 'generally applicable laws' and laws aimed specifically at a state").
111
Sec, for example, Livadas v Bradshaw, 512 US 107 (1994) (state government may not
refuse to prosecute claims of workers who are governed by arbitration clause); Golden State
Tt'lmsit Corp. v Los Angeles, 475 US 608 (1986) (local government may not condition franchise renewal upon firm's settlement of strike); Wisconsin Dept. of lndustty, Labw and Human
Relatiom v Gould Inc., 475 US 282 (1986) (state government may not refuse to do business
with firms that violate federal labor law).

m See, for example, Wilder v Virginia Hospital Ass'n, 496 US 498 (1990) (Section 1983
action for failure to comply with federal reimbursement laws); Golden State Tnmrit Corp. v
Los A11geles, 493 US 103 (1989) (Section 1983 action for local action that was preempted
by NLRA).
110
See Evans v United States, 504 US 255, 261 (1992) (extortion defined as obtaining
property inter alia "'under color of official right'" pursuant to 18 USC§ 1951).
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law will be reluctant to permit the federal government to impose
onerous regulations. As the Court put the matter in the context of
intergovernmental tax immunities, "[W]here a government imposes
a nondiscriminatory tax, ... the threat of destroying another government can be realized only if the taxing government is willing to
impose taxes that will also destroy itself or its constituents." 125
This, indeed, has been the argument of some of the commentators
who support the distinction between targeted and generally applicable laws. 126 But the argument from virtual representation is of
dubious value in this context, for the evil that the anticommandeering doctrine purports to prevent is not the total destruction
of state governments (they would be useless to enforce federal
policy if they were destroyed) but rather their subservience to national policy. Federal regulation can undermine the values that
state governments serve-tyranny prevention, political community, innovation and diversity-without literally "destroying"
those governments or, more generally, without imposing requirements sufficiently onerous to trigger the generalized outrage posited by virtual representation theorists. To put the point more
concretely, we fail to see why a federal requirement that state governments properly find obnoxious would necessarily trigger hostility from private entities who are brought within the scope of the
requirement. Indeed, in the case where federal regulation hinders
the responsiveness of state governments to geographically diverse
citizen preferences, beliefs, etc., one might well expect businesses
to be less attuned to the local enthusiasms than public officials.127
Finally, in other areas of constitutional law, general-applicability
requirements are defended as prophylactic measures to screen out
problematic governmental motivation. 128 At some points, the
' 25

South Cm11/ina v Baker, 485 US 505 , 525-26 n 15 (1988).
for example, D . Bruce La Pierre, Political Accoumabitity in the National Political
Pt'Ocess- the Altemative to Judicial Review of Federalimzlssues, 80 Nw U L Rev 577, 648- 51
(1985); Edward A. Zelinsl,:y, Unfunded Mandates, Hidden Taxation, tmd The Tenth Amendment:
On Public Choice, Public Inm·est, and Public Seruices, 46 Vand L Rev 1355, 1385, 1411-12
116 Sec,

(1993).
117
Thus, for example, Professor Lessig recounts that many southern white business owners in fact supported the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as a means of allowing them to maximize
profits without offending local norms of racial subordination. Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation ofSociiJl Meaning, 62 U Chi L Rev 943, 965-66 (1995).
118
The content-discrimination component of free speech doctrine is defended this way.
See, for example, Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation tmd the First Amendmmt, 25 Wm &
Mary L Rev 189, 227- 33 (1983).
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Court in Printz seems to defend the general applicability component of anticommandeering doctrine this way. 129 But the degree to
which federal regulations infringe upon the values of federalism
seems to be wholly independent of the motives or intentions of
the officials who adopt the regulations. At best, motive or intention
may be relevant within an expressive account of the anticommandeering doctrine-an account that we consider in Part V below.
C. ADJUDICATION

The third demarcation explicitly drawn by the Court in Printz
and New York concerns the nature of the commandeered function.
The federal government may permissibly commandeer the performance of judicial functions by state officials, but it may not compel
them either to legislate or to undertake the variety of tasks best
understood as executive rather than judicial (e.g., the investigative
tasks at issue in Printz itself). Printz made clear that the line lay
between adjudication and other functions, not between legislation
and other functions: "Testa [v Katt} stands for the proposition that
state courts cannot refuse to apply federal law-a conclusion mandated by the terms of the Supremacy Clause ('the Judges in every
State shall be bound [by federal law]') .... [T)hat says nothing
about whether state executive officers must administer federal
law." 130 Although the investigative, law-enforcement function
commandeered by the Brady Act in Printz was not legislative, neither was it judicial, and therefore directing state officials to perform that function was unconstitutional. Printz also stated explicitly that the line was a functional one: state officials who were not
judges were nonetheless subject to commandeering, insofar as they
performed adjudicatory functions.
It is within the power of the States, as it is within the power
of the Federal Government, to transfer some adjudicatory
functions to administrative agencies, with opportunity for subsequent judicial review. But it is also within the power of Congress to prescribe, explicitly or by implication (as in the legisla-

129
"But where, as here, it is the whole object of the law to direct the functioning of the
state executive, and hence to compromise the structural framework of dual sovereignty,
such a ' balancing' analysis is inappropriate." Printz, 117 S Ct at 2383.
IJO Id at 2381 (second alteration in original).
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tion at issue in FERC (v Mississippi]), that those adjudications
must take account of federal law. 131

Evan Caminker, a prominent scholarly critic of Printz, has denied a textual warrant for the Court's distinction between judicial
and nonjudicial functions. 132 Professor Caminker has argued, persuasively, that there is no specific basis in the Supremacy Clause
for the judicial/nonjudicial distinction, and we would add that
there is no specific textual basis for that distinction anywhere else
in the Constitution. 133 On the other hand, Caminker has not
shown, nor does he purport to show, that the text of the Constitution specifically precludes this demarcation. If, for example, the
demarcation were justified in light of certain federalism values,
then that demarcation could be constitutionally justified, insofar
as those values figure in constitutional adjudication (say, via the
Tenth Amendment). ·
Can the judicial/nonjudicial line be thus defended, in light of
some or all of the values we described in Pan I? Consider two
alternate federal statutes. One statute, D, directs a state regulatory
agency (e.g., an environmental agency, or a health-and-safety
agency) to enact and enforce certain rules in a particular area, and
preempts all other rules and all private causes of action in that
area. A counterpart statute, D', directs the agency to entertain
specified causes of action, which are granted to private citizens
(e.g., to persons harmed by pollution, or to injured workers), and
preempts all rules and all other causes of action in that area. If
Printz had declined to draw a demarcation between judicial and
nonjudicial functions, then both D and D' would count as unconstitutional commandeering. D imposes an affirmative obligation
upon state regulators, and so does D'. For D unconditionally requires the regulators to issue rules and initiate prosecutions, while
D' unconditionally requires them to issue adjudicative orders conferring benefits (damages or injunctive relief) upon successful
nl

Id at 2381 n 14 (citation o mitted).

See Caminker, 1997 Supreme Court Review at 212-1 5 (cited in note I).
In particular, the fact that Article m permits Congress to refrain from establishing
lower federal courts may lend textual support to the exclusion of state judges from the
anticommandeering rule, but not to the further exclusion of stare officials who are not
judges but exercise the judicial function, s uch as the regulators in FERC. See Printz, 117
Ct at 2371 (relying upon Article
to justify imposition of federal obligations upon State
judges).
Ill
Ill

s
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federa l claimants, whose claims the regulators are, in turn, unconditionally required to adjudicate. But, we take it, D' is now
constitutionally permissible.' 34
Does statute D, in fact, offend federalism values more gravely
than statute D'? We think not. Statute D imposes a federal policy
upon the states, by a combination of preemption plus a requirement that the agency issue and enforce certain rules. Statute D'
imposes a federa l policy upon the states, by a combination of preemption plus a requirement that the agency entertain certain
causes of action. It is very hard to see how D and D' differ, ceteris
paribus, with respect to the values of responsiveness to diversity
and innovation. If, for example, the provisions of D' defining the
commandeered causes of action are quite open-ended, then there
will be a fair bit of room for interstate variation here. Then again,
if the provisions of D defining the commandeered rules are quite
open-ended, there will be analogous room for variation. To put
the point another way: Commandeering statutes such as D and D'
differentially facilitate interstate variation insofar as they differentially delegate authority to the states; but it is hard to see how two
statutes that delegate an equal amount of authority should differentially facilitate variation just by virtue of the function (legislative
or executive versus judicial) that the statutes commandeer.m
Consider next the tyranny-prevention function of federalism.
Here, the distinction between judicial and nonjudicial functions
cuts the wrong way, at least with respect to certain lcinds of tyrannies: the tyranny of organized groups, and official tyranny. There
is a well-developed literature, both theoretical and empirical, for
the proposition that agency policy-making through adjudication is
'~' lY is, in fact, loosely based on the s tatute upheld in FERC v Mississippi. See 456 US
at 759-61. Insofar as lY simply instructs an existing agency with adjudicatory authority to
entertain federal causes of actions where the agency has jurisdiction over "analogous" state
claims, it would not (we take it) be constitu1ionally impermissible despite the fact that it
constitutes commandeering. See nore 17; FERC, 456 US at 760 (upholding requirement
that state regulatory commissions can comply with by adjudicating claims, over challenge
by Mississippi Public Service Commission, because "It] he Mississippi Commission has jurisdiction to entertain claims analogous to those granred by [the federal statute], and it can
satisfy [the statutory! requirements simply by opening it~ doors to claimant~").
Ill Notably, the Court in Pt-i71tz declined to draw a demarcation, either way, along the
dimension of delegation. See 117 S Ct ar 2382 (rejecting argument that "requiring stare
officers ro perform discrete, ministerial tasks specified by Congress does not violate the
principle of Nw York because it does nO[ diminish the accountability of stare or federal
officials").
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less salient to the general public, and thus more likely to facilitate
the "capture" of agencies by organized groups or bureaucratic interests, than the relatively high-visibility process of rule making. u6
The rules impermissibly commandeered by statute D will be more
salient, not less salient, than the adjudicatory orders permissibly
commandeered by statute D'.
The defender of Printz might object here that just because the
rules are more salient, they are more likely to (unjustifiably) reflect
majority interests within the state. The judicial/nonjudicial distinction cuts the wrong way with respect to interest-group and
official tyranny, but the right way with respect to majoritarian tyranny-or so the defense of Printz might go. While there is some
plausibility to this line of argument, we think that it faces two
difficulties: (a) the difficulty of making commensurate different tyranny types that we mentioned in Part I, and (b) the difficulty that
the tyranny types most relevant to constitutional doctrines that
limit national power would seem to be official or minoritarian tyranny, not majoritarian tyranny, since a unitary national government is particularly prone to the first two types of tyranny, not
the last. 137
Finally, consider the value of political community. Do D and
D' differ with respect to this value? Note, crucially, that in each
case the commandeered officials are state agency officials-that is,
officials who are typically unelected. Thus it is hard to see how
D and D' differentially impede the flourishing of a state poli tical
community-at least on the standard view that it is via electoral
politics, paradigmatically, via the lawmaking activities of elected
state legislators, that intrinsic political values are fostered by constitutional federalism. To be sure, the state agency rule makers and
prosecutors in D are formally and informally subject to elected
officials (the state governor and the state legislators), but the same
is true, or may be true, of the state agency adjudicators in D'. Notably, nothing in Printz restricts the applicability of the judicialfunction category to politically insulated adjudicators. For example, it is constitutionally permissible for the federal government
6
" See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Sro~11 Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 Admin L Rev
59, 59-60 (1995) (summarizing benefits of rule making).
.

111
See Rapaczynski, 1985 Supreme Court Review at 385-86 (arguing that federalism is
not tyranny-reducing with respect to majoritarian tyranny, except for the oppression by
the national government of geographically defined minorities) (cited in note 24).
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to require that state commissioners adjudicate federal claims and
defenses-as indeed the federal government did in the starute upheld in FERC v Mississippi-and Printz explicitly preserves this aspect of FERC, even though commissioners are notoriously not insulated from electoral politics. 138
IV.

THE SouRcE OF FEDERAL JlowER: THE REcoNSTRUCTION
AMENDMENTS AS BoUNDARIES

The cases in which the Court has enunciated and elaborated the anticommandeering principle have exclusively concerned
starues adopted under the Commerce Clause. As a result, there is
as yet no authoritative guidance concerning how that principle applies to starutes grounded in other grants of congressional power.
Prior commentators have generally viewed this as an open question, though the majority position has been a tentative conclusion
that starutes adopted pursuant to the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and
Fifteenth Amendments will fall outside of the prohibition on
commandeering. 139
In our view, the hesitancy of the commentators is misplaced, for
a demarcation between federal statutes grounded on the Reconstruction Amendments, and federal statutes grounded on the Commerce Clause or other Article I powers- unlike the demarcations
discussed in Parts II and III-is well grounded in constitutional
history, judicial doctrine, and legislative practice, as well as being
justified by the values of constitutional federalism. We believe,
however, that the fuzziness of this demarcation- tied as it is to
the Court's fuzzy doctrine, articulated in the Boerne case, concerning the scope of the power granted to Congress by the Reconstruction Amendments- will make the demarcation, like its less theoretically satisfying cognates, a shaky foundation for a workable
federalism jurisprudence.
Bs A classic article is Barry R. Weingast and Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or
Congressima/ Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commissio11, 9 1 J Pol Econ
765 (1983).
9
1l See Caminker, 95 Colum L Rev at 1006 n 13, 1087 n 325; Hills, 96 MichL Rev at
888-89 (both cited in note !); Merritt, 88 Colum L Rev at 45-46 (cited in note 24); Merritt,
65 U Colo L Rev at 832 (cited in note 121). Professor Caminker appears recently to have
gained confidence in the view that the anticommandeering principle is bounded by Section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as weU by the parallel enforcement provisions of the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. See Caminkcr, 1997 Supreme Court Review at 23842 (cited in note 1).
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A. HISTORY, DOCTRINE, AND PRACTICE

The proposition that the Reconstruction Amendments are exceptional, for federalism purposes, is not newly minted for the
anticommandeering cases. The Supreme Court has long held that
legislation adopted pursuant to the Reconstruction Amendments
stands on a uniquely strong ground vis-a-vis the claims of
federalism.
The issue was fully ventilated in Ex Parte Virginia, 140 where a
decisive majority of the Court rejected claims that the enforcement
power of Congress under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
was constrained by considerations of state autonomy. The case involved a Virginia judge who had been indicted and arrested pursuant to a federal statute for excluding African Americans from service as grand and petit jurors, and who filed a petition for writ of
habeas corpus. Joined by a similar petition by the state of Virginia
itself, the judge claimed that the statute unconstitutionally intruded on state autonomy in violation of "the rights of the state
of Virginia." 14 1 The argument persuaded two justices, Field and
Clifford, who- relying on antebellum conceptions of federalism
and cases such as Kentucky v Dennison-argued that nothing
could have a greater tendency to destroy the independence and
autonomy of the states; reduce them to a humiliating and degrading dependence upon the central government .. . than the
doctrine asserted in this case, that Congress can exercise coercive authority over judicial officers of the states in the discharge
of their duties under state laws. It will be only another step in
the same direction towards consolidation, when it assumes to
exercise similar coercive authority over governors and legislators of the States. 142

Seven members of the Court, however, rejected the attack on the
federa l statute. They did not deny the previous constraints of fed·~

100

us 339 (1879).

141

Id at 341.
142
Id at 358 (Field dissenting). Justice Field continued, in language reminiscent of some
contemporary commentators, "No legislation would be appropriate (under Section 5] which
should ... conflict with the implied prohibitions upon Congress. They are as obligatory
as the express prohibitions. The Constitution, as already stated, contemplates the existence
and independence of the States in all their reserved powers." Id at 361. Justices Field and
C lifford reiterated their position in dissent from Stmuder v West Virginia, 100 US 303
(1879).
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eralism, but recognized that the framing and ratification of the
Reconstruction Amendments had effected a large change in federal-state relations. According to the Court:
[It does not] make any difference that such legislation is restrictive of what the State might have done before the constitutional amendment was adopted. The prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment are directed to the States, and they are to
a degree restrictions of State power. It is these which Congress
is empowered to enforce, and to enforce against State action,
however put forth, whether that action be executive, legislative,
or judicial. Such enforcement is no invasion of State sovereignty .... Indeed, every addition of power to the general
government involves a corresponding diminution of the governmental power of the States. It is carved out of them.14l

This conception of the Reconstruction Amendments as a pro
tanto diminution of the immunities otherwise accorded to the
states has remained firm in the face of succeeding waves of enthusiasm for states' rights. Ex Parte Virginitt has been regularly invoked
by the Court in support of the proposition that the existence or
threat of violations of those amendments justifies federal infringement of state sovereiguty. 144 Most recently, during the last period
of revival of enforceable federalism constraints on the national
government-the National League of Cities period-the Court repeatedly confirmed that constraining doctrines would be qualified
by the Reconstruction Amendments. In school desegregation and
other institutional reform cases, federal decrees intruded into the
prerogatives of state officials in ways that would seemingly145 constitute commandeering: the officials were commanded affirmatively to exercise their sovereign authority. The Court, however,
rejected Tenth Amendment challenges to such decrees. 146
141

100 US at 346.
See, for example, Mitchrmt v Foster, 407 US 225, 240, 242 (1972); South Carolina v
/(ptzmbach, 383 US 301, 325-27 (1966).
145 We say "seemingly," given the possible exception from the anticommandeering doctrine for certain affirmative remedial duties. See note 80.
146 Sec MissoUI-i v Jenkins, 495 US 33, 55 ( 1990) ("The Fourteenth Amendment .. . was
avowedly directed against the power of the States, and so permits a federal court to disestablish local government institutions that interfere with its commands.") (internal quotations
and citations omitted); Milliken v Bradley, 433 US 267, 291 (1977) ("[T)here is no merit to
petitioners' claims that the relief ordered here violates the Tenth Amendment and general
principles of federalism."); Monell v Department of Social Services, 436 US 658, 690 n 54
(1978) ("There is certainly no constitutional impediment to municipal liability [under Section 1983 for a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment] .... Natio11ol League of Cities v
Usery is irrelevant to our consideration of this case.").
144
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Similarly, despite increasingly solicitous regard for "the Eleventh Amendment, and the principle of state sovereignty which it
embodies," 147 the Court has remained clear that in the exercise of
its power under the Reconstruction Amendments, Congress may
impose otherwise impermissible liability on the states in federal
courts. In Fitzpatrick v Bitzer, Justice Rehnquist, writing for seven
members of the Court, quoted Ex Parte Virginia at length to support the holding that the Fourteenth Amendment constituted an
"expansion of Congress' powers-with the corresponding diminution of state sovereignty" sufficient to permit Congress to impose
damage liability on states notwithstanding the Eleventh Amendment. 148 The power of Congress under Section 5 to impose liability
on states has since remained a staple of the Supreme Court's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence. 149
Under settled doctrine, Congress may invade state sovereignty
by appropriate legislation designed to protect against violations of
the Reconstruction Amendments. The leading case is City of Rome
v United States, I so where the Court reviewed the application of the
preclearance provisions of the Voting Rights Act to changes in
municipal governance, though the changes did not in themselves
(the Court assumed) violate the Fifteenth Amendment. The City
of Rome argued that National League of Cities precluded federal
intervention into the integral state function of self-government by
popular election, and indeed it is difficult to imagine what function
lies closer to the heart of state autonomy. Yet the Supreme Court
rejected the claim on the basis of Ex Parte Virginia and Fitzpatrick
v Bitzer. lSI
1
"

Fitzbatrick v Bitzn·, 427 US 445, 456 (1976).

,q Id

at 455.

•~ See

Idaho v Coeur d'A fme Tribe, 11 7 S Ct 2028, 2039 (1997) (opinion of Kennedy);
Snnino/e Tribe of Fla. v Fwridn, 517 US 44, 59, 65 (1996); Miss®ri v Jmkins, 491 US 274,
279 (1989); Dellmuth v Muth, 491 US 223, 227 (1989); Will v Michigan Dept of State Police,
491 US 58, 66 (1989); AtMcadero Stntt Hosp. v Scanlon, 473 US 234, 238 (1985); Pmnhum
Statt School & Ho!p. v Haldmnan, 465 US 89, 99 (1984); Maher v Gagne, 448 US 122, 132
(1980); Hutto v Finney, 437 US 678, 693 (1978); Pennsylvania v Union GM Co., 491 US I,
41 (1989) (Scalia concurring and dissenting), overruled, Seminole Tribe of Fla. v Florida, 517

us 44 (1996).

uo 446 US I 56 (I 980).
11 1

Id at 178-80. The dissenters in City of Rome did not disagree with the proposition that
Congress may infringe state autonomy so as to vindicate rights under the Reconstruction
Amendments, but rather rejected the majority's view of the scope of Congress's enforcement
power. See id at 200-05 (Powell dissenting); id at 209- 19 (Rehnquist dissenting).
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... Fitzpatrick stands for the proposition that principles of federalism that might otherwise be an obstacle to congressional
authority are necessarily overriden by the power to enforce the
Civil War Amendments "by appropriate legislation." Those
Amendments were specifically designed as an expansion of federal power and an intrusion on state sovereignty. Applying this
principle, we hold that Congress had the authority to regulate
state and local voting through the provisions of the Voting
Rights Act. 152

The Court has since reiterated that "when properly exercising its
power under§ 5 [of the Fourteenth Amendment], Congress is not
limited by the same Tenth Amendment constraints that circumscribe the exercise of its Commerce Clause powers." 153
It is true that the Court, in our newest period of revived federalism constraints, has not squarely held that the Reconstruction
Amendments constitute an exception to the current, constraining
doctrines-namely, the anticommandeering doctrines announced
by Printz and New York. But last Term's opinion in Yeskey clearly
suggests as much. The Court's language in Yeskey implies that the
anticommandeering doctrines limit only legislation adopted pursuant to the Commerce Clause, and are inapplicable to a federal statute appropriately grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment. 154
m Id at 179-80.
ISl EEOC v Wyoming, 460 US 226, 243 n 18 (1983). See id at 259 (Burger dissenting);
Hodel v Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 US 264, 287 n 28 (1981). To be
sure, in Gregory v Aslmvft, the Court observed that "this Court has never held that the
Amendment may be applied in complete disregard for a State's constitutional powers," 501
US at 468, but Yeskey reads Ashcroft as a case involving canons of statutory construction.
See 118 S Ct at 1954. The Court's most recent word on the subject is to reaffim1 that:
"Legislation which deters or remedies constitutional violations can fall within the sweep
of Congress' enforcement power even if in the process it prohibits conduct which is not
itself unconstitutional and intrudes into 'legislative spheres of autonomy previously reserved
to the States.'" Botrne, I 17 S Ct at 2163 (quoting Fitzpatrick v Bitztr, 422 US at 455). As
this article went to press, the Supreme Court, in a Voting Rights Act case, reiterated the
position that the "Reconstruction Amendments hy their nature com template some intrusion
into areas traditionally reserved to the States" and repeated the language quoted above
from Bomze. Lopez v Momm·ey County, 119 S Ct 693, 703- 4 (1999).
IH In declining to address the merits of the constitutional challenge to the ADA, the
Court commented: "We do not address another issue presented by petitioners: whether
application of the ADA to state prisons is a constitutional exercise of Congress's power
under either the Commerce Clause, compare Printz v United States with Garcia v San Antonio Metropolitan Trtmsit Authority, or § S of the Fourteenth Amendment, see City of 8om1e
v. Fwres." 118 S Ct at 1956 (citations omitted). A fair implication of the comment is that
Printz limits legislation adopted pursuant to the Commerce Clause, while legislation
adopted pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment is exempt from that limit if appropriate
under the standards of Bom1e. To be sure, however, a dictum articulated in the process of
refusing tO address a substantive issue is not hinding precedent.
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Given the deep roots of this position, and the reliance of the Court
in Printz on "historical understanding and practice, . . . the structure of the Constitution, and . . . the jurisprudence of this
Court" 155 as the elements used to identify the "'essential postulate[s]' " 156 of federalism, there is every reason to believe that the
Court will confirm this suggestion in a definitive holding when
the issue is squarely presented.
A skeptic might respond that interventions under the Fourteenth Amendment do not require commandeering of the sort
condemned by New York and Printz. One might argue that, since
the Constitution protects only against government action rather
than government inaction, the only legislation required to implement the Fourteenth Amendment will impose negative duties and
will thus be a permissible exercise of the federal preemption power.
But such a response fails to account both for the scope of wellsettled constitutional doctrine and for the legitimacy of congressional action under the Fourteenth Amendment to prevent, as well
as to remedy, constitutional violations.
The point is clear with respect to the Equal Protection Clause.
An invidious refusal to provide protection or benefits is as much
an invasion of the constitutional mandate as an invidious imposition of punishment. In theory, the former refusal can be cured by
refusing to provide benefits to anyone; but in practice, such a refusal may be out of the question. Thus equality norms will often,
in effect, require affirmative action by the state. To take one example of particular salience to the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment: the Reconstruction Congress was concerned with the differential failure to enforce state laws against the Ku Klux Klan. 157
Obviously, a state will not come into compliance with the Fourteenth Amendment and its implementing statutes by refusing to
enforce state laws against anyone; rather, state officials will be required to take affirmative and authoritative action to protect Mrican Americans and Union sympathizers. 158
Ill

117 S Cr ar 2370.

16

s ld at 2376 (quoting Principality of Monaco v Mississippi, 292 US 313, 322 (1934)) (alteration in original).
Ill See Mom-oe v Pope, 365 US 167, 171-83 (1961) (describing this concern), overruled
on other grounds, Mo1mel/ v Department of Social Se1-vices, 436 US 658 (1978).
ISs Tbis analysis depends in parr on a matter rhe Court has nor yet addressed: the rightness
of the connection between the federal directive and action by stare officials, necessary to
constitute commandeering. lr is as yet unclear whether a directive constitutes impermissible

2)

THE NEW ETIQUETTE OF FEDERALISM

125

With respect to the Due Process Clause and incorporated rightS,
the objection has somewhat greater force. But even in the area of
due process, constitutional doctrine not infrequently requires state
actors to take affirmative measures to live up to constitutional
norms, 159 and in such cases an exception for Fourteenth Amendment obligations will be necessary. Moreover, in all areas, it is
entirely plausible that Congress may legitimately impose some
prophylactic affirmative obligations. 160
The Court's failure to recognize a Reconstruction-Amendment
exception to the anticommandeering principle would disrupt large
segmentS of our current legal structure. A wide array of federal
legislation is premised on the proposition that, in implementing
the Reconstruction Amendments, Congress can impinge on the
way that state entities choose to structure their internal processes.
Some of this legislation is contained in conditional grantS like Title
VI (although even here the capacity of Congress to allow damage
actions in defiance of the Eleventh Amendment is of some relevance).161 But much other legislation-most prominently Title
VTI162 and the voting rights legislation sustained in City of Rwu,
as well as municipal responsibility for deliberate indifference to
constitutional violations 163-also requires the states to take affircommandeering only if it logically entails state action, or more broadly if such action is
effectively compelled. The facts of both Printz and New York suggest the broader view,
which would give the anticommandeering doctrine wider scope and require more insistently
the exception for equal protection norms.
IS• T hus, for example, due process can obligate a state to provide medical services to
individuals in state custody, see West v Atkins, 487 US 42 (1988); City of Revm v Mass.
Gm~ml Horp., 463 US 239 (1983); Yormgbet-g v Romeo, 457 US 307 ( 1982); Estelle v Gambit,
429 lJS 97 (1976) (Eighth Amendment, applied against states via due process component
of Fourteenth Amendment); and co provide retroactive relief to entities from which unlawful
taxes have been collected, see Reich v Collins, 513 US 106 (1994); McKesson C()rp. v Division
of Alcoholic Bevet·ages and Tobacco, 496 US 18 (1990). Although the federal imposition of
certain affirmative remedial obligations upon the states arguably constitutes permissible pre·
emption, quite apart from any special exception from the anticommandeering doctrine for
statures grounded upon Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, see note 80, a Section
5 exception would surely be needed to accommodate the Youngberg line of cases.
l60 Although the Court in 8oUTle, discussed in Part IV.C., limited the scope of congressional power under Section 5, Boeme also affirmed that some prophylactic legislation is
authorized by that provision. See, for example, 117 S Ct at 2 163-64.
161 42 USC§ lOOOd-7 authorizes damage actions against state entities under various federal civil rights statutes including Title VI, notwithstanding the strictures of the Eleventh
Amendment. See Fra11klin v Gwimzttt Cormty Public Schools, 503 US 60, 72 (1992).
161 See Fitzpatrick v Bitzer, 427 US 445, 448 n 2 (1976) (discussing 1972 amendments,
extending Title Vll to public employers).
16
' See City of Canto11 v Hams, 489 US 3 78 ( 1989).
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mative measures to comply with federal civil rights mandates. The
Court in Yeskey virtually invited a properly raised challenge to the
provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act that require state
accommodation of the needs of handicapped individuals, but such
a challenge could not be sustained without overturning large elements of the federal civil rights regime. 164
B. JUSTIFICATlON

The question remains whether a distinction between Congress's
powers under the Reconstruction Amendments and Congress's
powers under Article I can be justified. The proposition that Congress must have the authority to override putative state-sovereignty
constraints, pursuant to its powers under the Reconstruction
Amendments, is perfectly consistent with the proposition that
Congress should also have such authority pursuant to its powers
under the Commerce Clause and the other power-conferring provisions of Article I. After all, although the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment "by their own terms embody limitations on
state authority," 165 the Commerce Clause has also been understood
since Gibbons v Ogden 166 to limit state authority, and the Supremacy
Clause explicitly mentions the states. Nonetheless, we believe that
a distinction between the Reconstruction Amendments and Article
I, for purposes of federalism constraints on the national government, is indeed justified by federalism values.
Innovation and diversity. A capacity of state government to experiment with the rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment167
1110
To the extent one can read tea leaves, the ADA might well be sustained against such
a challenge. The Court denied certiorari after Yeskey in Amtstrong v Wilson, a prison case
where the Ninth Circuit rejected a plain-statement challenge to the entry of a srructural
injunction under the ADA, and Clark v Califomia, which held that the ADA was a legitimate
exercise of congressional power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and thus
properly abrogated the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Armstrong v Wilso11,
124 F3d 1019 (9th Cir 1997), cert denied, 118 S Ct 2340 (1998); Clark v Califumia, 123
F3d 1267 (9th Cir 1997), ccrt denied, 118 S Ct 2340 (1998). While this article was in
press, the Court specifically amended an order granting certiorari to exclude the question
of whether the ADA exceeds congressional powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Olmstead v LC., 119 S Ct 633 (1998).
16
S Fitzpatrick v 8it:zt1; 427 US at 456.
166
22
1 (1824).
167 For the sake of analytic clarity and simplicity, the following discussion focuses on the
distinction between Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause;
but we helieve that our argumentS can he generalized to support a distinction between all
of the enforcement provisions of the Reconstruction AmendmentS and all of Congress's
Article r powers.
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cannot rest on the usual federalist arguments about state innovation and responsiveness. The case for interstate variation is usually
framed in terms of the maximjzation of preference satisfaction (or,
more generally, the maximization of good consequences). 168 A system in which constituent preferences are better satisfied is, ceteris
paribus, taken to be a superior one; and, at this level, all preferences are taken to be pretty much equal. In short, the nonnative
presuppositions underlying the innovation and diversity arguments
for federalism, as these arguments are usually framed, are straightforwardly consequentialist. And the political economy of Commerce Clause legislation fits nicely with these consequentialist presuppositions. Such legislation is, for the most part, the product of
"low" or "ordinary" politics.
By contrast, a Section 5 determination is (usually) a matter of
"high politics." It purports to implement basic rights that trump
(ordinary) measures of good or bad consequences. Indeed, after
Boerne, legislation grounded upon Section 5 must be commensurate with a threatened or past violation of the Constitution recognized by the Court itself. 169 Whereas Commerce Clause statutes
may serve any plausible account of the national interest, statutes
under the Fourteenth Amendment must be keyed to preserving
the rights of individuals under the Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses.
The degree to which citizen preferences are satisfied by such
statutes, or to which they maximize good consequences, is not the
relevant criterion. Our system of constitutional federalism does not
contemplate that Americans should lose human rights embedded
in our national Constitution when they travel from state to state, 170
and states may not in general legitimately act on the proposition
that they would prefer not to enforce national norms of equality
and liberty. The "privt"teges" and "immunities" of citizenship are
national, not local.
To be sure, one might argue that a decision by state officials to
decline compliance with national mandates is a potentially important judgment that should be grappled with by the national polity
163

For a clear example, see McConnell, 54 U Chi L Rev at 1493-94 (cited in note 24).
See Part IV.C.
170 States may, pursuant to their own constitutions, statutes, or case law, protect these
interests to a greater degree than the national norms require, but they may not fall below
the national baseline.
169
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in making appropriate decisions about how best to realize constitutional aspirations. 171 This argument is not without force, but we
find it ultimately unpersuasive.
First, it is worth considering exactly who the participants in the
dialogue are likely to be. To the extent that the anticommandeering doctrine protects only against requiring state or local legislatures to adopt statutes according to federal design, the argument
seems plausible. Legislatures are potential coauthors of an ongoing
constitutional specification, and the doctrine parallels the Court's
reluctance to allow state and local legislators to be sued for adopting unconstitutionallaws. 172 Just as legislative immunity can be defended as a means of allowing state and local challenges and constitutional dialogue regarding controversial decisions of the Court,
the ability of state and local legislatures to refuse to participate in
congressional interpretations of the Constitution may be salutary.
But, as currently framed, the anticommandeering principle is
hardly so limited. After Printz, it includes every state nonjudicial
official who exercises governmental power, and there is reason to
doubt whether the constitutional understanding of the sheriff's
deputy in Boise, Idaho, the welfare caseworker in New York, and
the librarian in Huntsville, Alabama, carries the same normative
force as the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions. 173 Just as the
Court declines to extend immunity to such executive officials for
defiance of constitutional norms under Section 1983, there is good
reason to refuse them the immunity of the anticommandeering
doctrine. 174
Second, since every state nonjudicial official has license to participate in the dialogue in question, the "discussion" is likely to
be less than a focused interaction on matters of constitutional prin171
See, for example, Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Jndicinl Review, 9 1 Mich L Rev 577
(1993); Rohert A. Burt, The Constitution in C(llif/ict (Belknap, 1992); Louis Fisher, Co1zstitutionnl Dialogues: Imerpretntion as Political Process (Prin<.-eton U Press, 1988); Robert M. Cover,
The Supreme Com-t, 1982 Term- Foreword: Nomos 011d Nnn'lJtive, 97 Harv L Rev 4 (1983).

171

See c:1ses cited in note 65.

David Yassky, Eros of the Fim. Amendment, 91 Colum L Rev 1699, 1712 (1991)
(describing Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions).
17• See Adler, 145 U Pa L Rev at 813-44 (cited in note 45) (arguing that judicial review
of agency decisions may not be countermajoritarian even if judicial review of statutes is);
Seth F. Kreimer, Exploring the Dark Mntte1· ofJudicial Review: A C(l1zstituti(l110l Census of tbe
1990s, 5 Wm & Mary Bill ofRtsJ 427, 506- 08 (1997) (arguing that street-level bureaucrats
are not likely to be good constitutional decision makers).
t7J See
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ciple. When every such official may demand her reservation price
as the condition of participating in a federal program, what
emerges is a market that measures the desire of state officials to
resist national norms. Since these norms represent judgments by
the national polity that the states are inadequately protecting the
rights of their minorities in the first place, it is no surprise that
state officials disagree. T he strength of their disagreement is less
than · a persuasive ground for rethinking national priorities.
Finally, the variation that will emerge from normative dialogue
by states has costs. One of the boasts of America in the aftermath
of the Civil War is that all have identical rights of national citizenship. The Fourteenth Amendment rejected the proposition in Dred
Scott 11 s that national rights are derived from state citizenship. Section 5 legislation purports to provide the benefits of the Fourteenth Amendment to all the citizenry; the interstate equality of
constitutional rights, and of statutory rights that enforce them, is,
we suggest, in part what constitutes the United States as a national
political community.
Tyranny prevention. In the area of Commerce Clause legislation,
the outcome of a legitimate state political process may provide a
locus of justifiable resistance to national tyranny. A tyrannical national initiative would, on this theory, be met not with armed resistance, but with the increased costs, both political and practical,
that come from determined noncooperation by state governments.176 But the theory rests on the premise that the state decision
of noncooperation is the outcome of a legitimate process-specifically, in this context, a process that is less likely to be unjustifiably responsive to the interests of particular groups, that is, "tyrannical." The theory does not plausibly extend, for example, to trash
haulers who wish passively to resist the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act. The "double security" claim is not a brief for anarchy, but for countervailing legitimate public power.
Unlike Commerce Clause legislation, the mandates of the Fourteenth Amendment set the parameters of what constitutes a legitimate polity. To the extent that constitutional provisions can be

Ill

Srott v Srmdford, 60 US 393 (1857).

116

Consider the unsuccessful effortS by New York City to invoke Printz in refusing to
cooperate with federal anti-immigrant initiatives. City of New York v U11ittd Statts, 971 F

Supp 789 (SONY 1997).
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clearly characterized as protecting the elements of a functioning
democracy, the point is obvious. A decision made by a state entity
that fails to abide by baseline notions of equality and political participation cannot be credited with resisting national tyranny.
Where it undercuts the very norms that block the capture of state
governments by powerful factions, state resistance to national
mandates abets tyranny rather than reducing it.
The harder case arises where the constitutional rights Congress
seeks to enforce are not quite so directly connected with political
participation. 177 Consider, for example, the obligation imposed by
the Americans with Disabilities Act to affirmatively accommodate
citizens with disabilities who seek services from state authorities. 178
The legitimacy of such interventions arises from the nature of
legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment. As we noted earlier,
in federal-state conflicts there are cross-cutting risks of tyranny: a
failure of federal intervention may permit state tyranny, but imposition of federal determinations risks national tyranny. In the case
of Commerce Clause legislation, nothing in the nature of the
Commerce Clause doctrine suggests that such legislation will systematically represent anything more than the desires of a national
majority. By contrast, after Boeme, proponents of legislation enacted under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment must persuade a court that the legislation is commensurate with the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment.
At a minimum, then, where the federal courts conclude that federal intervention is justified under Boerne, the probability of national tyranny is substantially diluted. Further, to the extent that
constitutional rights, albeit not protective of the democratic process itself, are nonetheless targeted against tyranny in the sense
that they prohibit outcomes likely to be the result of unjustified
responsiveness to particular groups or persons- the Takings
Clause is an example-then a Section 5 statute will be doubly different from the ordinary Commerce Clause statute. In such a case,
the risk of national tyranny will be lower, and the risk of state

117
Of course, some commentators clai m that large elements of the Bill of Rights are in
fact crucially linked to the preservation of a legitimate political process. See, for example,
John Hart Ely, Democracy and Dismm: A Theory of Judicial Revie·w (Harv U Press, 1980);
Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Co11stitution, 100 Yale L J l !31 (199I).
1111
See 42 USC §§ 1213 I et seq (I 994).
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tyranny will be higher, as compared to the case where Congress
is simply operating under the Commerce Clause.
Political community. The final federalist value we have highlighted prizes state decision making because of the intrinsic value
of democratic politics. But the point we made above about the role
of the Reconstruction Amendments in defining political legitimacy
can be repeated here. To the extent that congressional determinations under Section 5 implement constitutional norms that define
political legitimacy, countervailing determinations by states do not
promote the value of political community. There is nothing intrinsically valuable or important about citizen "participation" in state
institutions that fail to abide by baseline, legitimacy-defining
norms of equality and due process. And although, with respect to
other kinds of constitutional rights, there may in fact be intrinsic,
democratic values realized by the process of state dissent from federal statutes enforcing such rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, we hope to have shown here how such statutes are sufficiently different from straight Commerce Clause statutes-with
respect to the remaining federalism values of innovation, diversity,
and tyranny prevention-to warrant a general exception from the
anticommandeering doctrine.
C. LIMITS

The Fourteenth Amendment is capacious. The Due Process
Clause protects all "liberty" and "property'' against arbitrary deprivation; the Equal Protection Clause potentially implicates every
government decision that classifies its subjects. In the absence of
some limiting principle, therefore, a Section 5 exception from the
anticommandeering doctrine might reach so widely as to eviscerate
the practical import of Printz and New York. Almost any federal
intervention might be, with one degree of persuasiveness or another, justified as an effort to prevent the oppression of some instate minority. 179 Similarly, any government action that threatens
119
For examples of some far-reaching claims, see Wheeling & Lake Erie Railway Co. v
PUC, 141 F3d 88 (3d Cir 1998) (holding that the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory
Reform Act is Section 5 legislation protecting railroads from discriminatory taXation); Oregon Short Line Railroad Co. v Dept. of Revenue, 139 F3d 1259 (9th Cir 1998) (same); CSX
Transponatirm, Inc. v Bd. of Public Works, 138 F3d 537 (4th Cir 1998) (leaving issue open);
Abril v Virginia, 145 F3d 182 (4th Cir 1998) (rejecting the claim that the Fa.i r Labor Standards Act is Section 5 legislation); id at 185-86 (citing decisions from four other circuits
rejecting this claim); Biddlecome v University ofTexas, 1997 WL 124220 (SO Tex 1997)
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the liberty or property of any citizen might conceivably be subject
to federal regulation as a prophylactic protection against arbitrary
deprivation. 180
The Boerne Court adopted a tailoring doctrine to limit the scope
of congressional power under the Fourteenth Amendment. The
Court's standard requires a "congruence between the means used
and the ends to be achieved. The appropriateness of remedial measures must be considered in light of the evil presented. Strong
measures appropriate to address one harm may be an unwarranted
response to another, lesser one." 181 The principle appears to have
two dimensions. First, before it may be accepted as a legitimate
exercise of enforcement power under Section 5, a statute must be
shown to be directed toward the remedy or prevention of a harm
that would be regarded as a constitutional violation under the principles enunciated by the Court. Second, the degree of intrusion
into state prerogatives must be "proportionalO" to the degree or
likelihood of a constitutional violation. 182
The Boerne limitations serve to cabin what would otherwise be
a potentially all-engulfing exception from the anticommandeering
doctrines, and to bolster the normative case (in light of federalism
values) for the existence of that exception. Our normative arguments, above, for such a distinction generally assumed that Section
5 legislation would be fairly closely tied to the underlying constitutional norms. But it bears emphasis that Boerne's tailoring doctrine
itself is fuzzy, not clear. How well settled a constitutional proposition must be to support a Section 5 statute, how analogous the
evil aimed at must be to what the Court would recognize as a
constitutional violation, how likely the evil at issue must be, and
how narrowly tailored an intrusion must be to survive scrutiny un(holding that Family and Medical Leave Act is Section 5 legislation); Tbumson v Obio Star.e
Uuiv. Hosp., 5 F Supp Zd 574 (SD Ohio 1998) (holding that FMLA is not).
180
Compare College Savings Bank v Fla. Prepaid Postseco11dmy Education Expense Btl., 148
F3d 1343 (Fed Cir 1998) (holding that protection of patent right.~ against: deprivation without due process constitutes a Section 5 basis for statute that permits suit against state for
patent infringement), cert granted 1999 WL 5331 (US), with College Savings Bn11k v Fin.
Prepaid Postsecondmy Education E:rpmse Bd., 131 F3d 353 (3d C ir 1997) (rejecting comparable
claim under Lanham Act), cert granted !999 WL 5330 (US), and Cbnvez v Arte Pt~b/ico
Press, 157 F3d 282 (5th Cir 1998) (same). See also In •·e Sae1·ed Hemt Hosp., I 33 F3d 237
(3d Cir 1998) (rejecting "privilege or immunity" clause as basis for nhrogation of Eleventh
Amendment immunity by Bankruptcy Code).
181
Boeme, I I 7 S Ct at 2169 (citation omitted).
181

ld at Z164.
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der Boerne are all matters of degree. Any one of these variables
offers room for extensive debate. Since the ultimate judgment under Boerne will be a function of all the variables taken together,
we have serious doubts whether the tailoring doctrine will prove
workable. And since the Section 5 demarcation within anticommandeering jurisprudence is tied to Boerne, we similarly doubt the
clarity and workability of that line, as now drawn by the Court. 183
V. AN

ExPRESSIVE DEFENSE?

We have argued above that the bases for most of the distinctions the Court has used to cabin the disruptive potential of
the anticommandeering principle are at best obscure. On many of
these fronts, the best explanation one can muster for the lines the
Court has drawn seems to be that permitted actions "look" or
"feel" different. So, too, the actual placement of the line between
permissible and impermissible federal programs is difficult to discern. The important fact seems to be that some line has been
drawn, not exactly where the line falls.
The absence of a (nonexpressive) justification for the lines of
demarcation combined with the lack of definition of the lines
themselves suggests that the Court is not so much implementing
an effort to achieve particular policy goals or to embody particular
historical understandings as to express what it regards as the core
of American federalism. In line with the suggestion advanced by
a number of recent commentators that tl1e law's "expressive function" may justify rules that are inexplicable apart from what the
rules "say" or "mean," 184 the prohibition on commandeering as
defined by the Court could be justified as expressive of our regime
of constitutional federalism.

' 83 The opinion in Boenze is focused on Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. But if,
as we assume, irs tailoring doctrine is also applicable to the parallel enforcement provisions
of the Thineenth and Fifteenth AmendmentS, our critique can be generaliz.ed: the line
between a permissible commandeering grounded in one of the Reconstruction Amendments, and an impermissible commandeering merely grounded in Article 1, will prove unclear and perhaps unworkable.
1111 See, for example, Cass R. Sunstein, On tbe E.\tn·e.r.rive Function of Low, 144 U Pa Rev
2021 (1996); Lawrence Lessig, Tbe RegulatiOII of Social Meaning, 62 U Chi L Rev 943 (1995);
Richard H. Pildes and Richard G. Niemi, E.>t'(JH!ssive Hrmns, "Bizarre Districts," and Voting
Rigbts: Evaluating Election-District Apperwm1ces afte,. Sbr1w v Reuo, 92 MichL Rev 483 (1993).
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The expressive story proceeds at two levels. 185 First, just as it is
argued that some laws may be valuable as a means of altering the
norms that are ultimately internalized and implemented by private
actors, the prohibition of commandeering could be a mechanism
for strengthening the norm of regard for state interests in the federal political process. Second, the Court's decisions may be intrinsically important for the statements they make. Printz and New York
may in and of themselves express the nation's constitutive commitment to state autonomy in a way that defines us as a nation.
A. INSTRUMENTAL EFFECTS ON POLITICAL NORMS

1. The mechanisms. An instrumental expressive account could be
fleshed out in several ways. First, the prohibition of commandeering could alter the structure of political decision making: by
forcing federal legislators (or at least legislative assistants) to think
about where proposed legislation falls on a series of vaguely defined boundaries, the doctrine will, at the very least, temporarily
put issues of federalism on the legislative agenda. In framing any
legislation that affects states, a federal legislator must contemplate
whether the legislation constitutes commandeering or preemption,
and-if the former-whether it falls within the exceptions the
Court has recognized to the anticommandeering principle. None
of these evaluations will necessarily prevent enactment of the legislation, but like rules of etiquette in the private sector, they may
tend to guard against unthinking violation of relevant values (in
this case, the values of federalism). 186
A second, complementary, line of analysis rests on the proposi185 These two levels crack Professor Sunstein's account of two types of expressive theories
of law. Sec 144 U Pa L Rev at 2025-27 (cited in note 184).
186 The following excerpt from oral argumcm in New Y01·k v United States, sec 1992 US
TRANS LEXIS 197, •10-•1 I, suggests that the Court understands an anticommandeering
principle will be indicative rather than determinative:
MR. SCHIFF: No. We think PERC is quite distinguishable. The majority of
this Court in PERC made it quite clear that the state had a choice. lt didn 't really
have to do what that act of Congress required it to do hecause it didn't have to
regulate public utilities, whileQ UESTION: Well, you know that it, you know that's a, just a dream world .
. . . What arc the w1derlying values that you're trying to further by the Tenth
Amendment argument that you urge upon us? ls it, is this simply just a matter
of etiquette and form •. the etiquette of federalism, or is there something more
substantial?
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tion that the Supreme Court's decisions have independent normgenerating force beyond th~ specific threat of judicial invalidation.
When the Supreme Court invalidates commandeering legislation
as inconsistent with the values of federalism, even if the precise
reasoning behind the determination is obscure, the Court lends
support to those who argue against federal legislation on grounds
of state autonomy. Recognition that the Supreme Court views the
limitation of federal interference with state decision making as
constitutionally enforceable could galvanize these proponents of
autonomy. 187 Within Congress itself, legislators who regard the
Court as a source of normative guidance will view infringements
on state sovereignty with a more skeptical eye. To be sure, Congress has not infrequently asserted a willingness to take issue with
the Court, but the norm-reinforcing effect of the Court's decisions
need only change the vote of the marginal legislator to be significant. At the very least, pro-federalism decisions by the Supreme
Court make claims of constitutionally based state autonomy a legitimate part of political discourse.
Third, the anticommandeering doctrine may be a part of a strategy of normative change directed at the federal judiciary itself. A
requirement that lower court judges engage in the exercise of distinguishing commandeering from noncommandeering statutes
might make them sensitive to federalism concerns in other areas.
This doctrine may constitute one part of a broader revival of state
autonomy that, along with Lopez, Boerne, and Seminole Tribe, could
unleash the common-law evolution of federalism jurisprudence in
the lower federal courts. And allowing state attorneys general to
invoke Printz in adjudication might embolden them to press federalist claims in other areas. Arguably this has in fact occurred, although it is not often that such " law reform" arguments Qustifying
legal change in one area of law, by reference to what is needed in
an other) carry the day.
2. The virtues of ambiguity. In each of these scenarios, the formidable obscurity of the anticommandeering doctrine is arguably a
benefit rather than a cost. Justice Scalia commented in Printz that
ISJ Just as Brown v Board of Education and subsequent cases gave social force to claims of
proponents of African-American rights, the Court's recent series of statutory invalidations
may provide an impetuS to proponents of state autonomy.
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"an imprecise barrier against federal intrusion upon state authority
is not likely to be an effective one." 188 We have argued that, despite
this disclaimer, anticommandeering doctrine, as set forth by the
Court, is in fact made up of a series of "imprecise barriers." For
purposes of changing political norms, however, unclear boundaries
may sometimes be better than clear ones.
Insofar as the point of New York and Printz is to establish .rules
of etiquette that highlight the importance of state autonomy within
Congress, the enemy of meaningful ritual is rote. In the normal
course of events, we might expect the following cycle over time.
At the first stage, Congress begins to pass legislation without a
backward glance at state autonomy. At the second, the Court imposes boundaries that put federalism back on the agenda because
they require Congress to affix some sort of formal "seal" indicating
it has considered federalism. The seal may take the form of a clear
statement; the inclusion of a background threat of preemption (to
bring the statute within the permissible category of conditional
preemption) or a provision applying it to private parties (to make
it generally applicable); or a statement of findings in the legislative
history articulating a connection to interstate commerce or constitutional violations. But, whatever the formal prerequisites, in order
to affix the seal, someone in the legislative process has to think
about federalism.
The difficulty, from the point of view of the Court, is that such
a level of attention will not be stable. If doctrine is predictable, a
third stage is likely to evolve in which congressional aides discover
a repertoire of standard techniques that meet the formal requirements imposed by the Court, and begin to employ those techniques as a matter of course. Once the forms are safely in the word
processor, federalism becomes a matter of an aide calling up the
appropriate language, and Congress returns to its first mode of
proceeding in routine disregard of state autonomy where politics
so dictates. 189
188
117 S Ct at 2381 (rejecting proposed distinction between policy- making and nonpolicy-making functions).
189
This is the equilibrium in the Eleventh Amendment area that emerged in response
to the clear statement n1le of Atnscndero Stnte Hosp. v Scllnlon, 473 US 234, 238-39 (1985).
Congress prctry quickly learned the drill. See, for example, Seminole T1·ibes of F/11. v Fl01'id11,
517 US 44 (1996) (dear statement in Indian Gaming Regulatory Act; ahrogation of Eleventh Amendment immuniry held ineffective on other grounds); Dellmuth v Mmh, 491 US
223, 229- 30 (1989) (noting apparent clear statement in amendments to Rehabilitation An).
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One virtue of an opaque doctrine lies in its ability to delay the
emergence of the third stage of the process. As long as the Court's
doctrine lacks clarity, congressional drafters can never be sure that
any particular rote mechanism will avoid invalidation, and so must
proceed mindful of the brooding presence of the value of state
autonomy. Clear boundaries would allow proponents of federal
legislation to defend appropriately structured interventions on the
ground that the statutes do not violate norms of federalism. By
contrast, a doctrine precluding commandeering whose exact parameters are indeterminate casts a normative pall over every piece
of legislation that interferes with state activities. Further, as a matter of judicial realpolitik, an opaque doctrine may be superior, for
it allows the Court to threaten invalidation of a wide array of legislation, without binding itself to invalidate any particular (and popular) mandate. In this way, the Court puts federalism on the political agenda without depleting its own political capital.
Finally, if the Court is seeking to inculcate a sensitivity among
lower courts and governmental officials to the importance of values
of federalism, clarity is not as much of a virtue as generativity. The
Court has embarked on a common-law effort to elaborate a series
of limitations on federal authority. Although it cannot specify exactly what federalism requires, the Court can identify certain cases
that clearly overstep the bounds, and over time the nature of the
requirements will be fleshed out by the particular choices it makes
and the distinctions it draws. To facilitate this process, an initial
doctrine that throws up a large number of controverted examples
in the lower courts is preferable to one that allows courts and litigants to resolve issues without reflection.
3. The dark side ofnorm manipulation. Although the instrumental,
expressive argwnent just sketched out has some plausibility-the
anticommandeering doctrines might be explained as an attempt,
by the Court, to express regard for federalism and thereby to shape
norms governing political actors-we are ultimately unpersuaded.
First, we doubt the empirical presuppositions of the argument.
So, too, in the area of Commerce C lause re!,•ulation. The practice of deference to congressional fact finding, see, for example, Perez v United States, 402 US 146, 155-57 (197 1);
Kotzenbacb v McCiullg, 379 US 294, 299-301 (1964), resolved into a ritual announcement
of an effect on interstate commerce as the predicate for the exertion of national power.
One function of the lack of clarity of the Court's opinion in United States v Lopez, 5 J4 US
549 (1995), is to allow the Court to annotmce the ex.istence of new limits that Congress
must worry about, without providing easily evaded boundaries.
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For the anticommandeering doctrines to exert normative force on
members of Congress and other political actors, the doctrines
should at least be a subject of discussion. But a LEXIS survey of
the Congressional Record disclosed only six mentions of Printz. 190
New York was referred to marginally more often (21 times in six
years). 191 The cases appear somewhat more often in congressional
testimony, 192 and perhaps this could support a claim that their expressive effect is the mobilization of interest groups that will raise
the flag of federalism. But it is equally consistent with the hypothesis that- encased in a doctrine too opaque for most observers to
justify or fathom-the message has had little serious impact on
dialogue or decisions by Congress. 193
190 The reference.~ in 1998 were contained in one article on the inscrutability of Supreme
Court decisions, authored by a Judge Jerome Ferris, inserted into the Congressional Record
by Senator Leahy, see 144 Cong Rec S 11872, 11880 (Ocr 8, 1998); cwo claims that preemption of state products liability laws would be unconstitutional, authored by the National
Conference of Stare Legislatures and inserted into the Congressional Record, see 144 Cong
Rec 7707 Ouly 9, 1998); 144 Cong Rec S 7526 Ouly 7, 1998); and a claim by Senator
Hatch that limitations on attorneys fees in cobacco settlements violate Printz, see 144 Cong
Rec S 6149, 6168 0une 11, 1998). The 1997 references were contained in an article insened
into the record by Senator Leahy which criticized conservative judicial activism, see 143
Cong Rec S 11938, 11939 (Nov 7, 1997); and a list of recent Supreme Court cases, see
143 Cong Rec S 12023, 12026 (Nov 7, 1997).
191
ALEXIS search on November 29, !998, of the Congressional Record in the Genfed;
Record library for "New York v. United States and Date > 1991" yielded 21 citations.
Nor do the cases appear frequently in legislative history. A November 29, 1998, LEXIS
search for "Printz v. United Stares or New York v. United States and Date > 1991" in
the Legis;Cmtrpt library identified only three committee reports. Two involved legislation
that was crafted to avoid the anticommandeering limitation by attaching requirements ro
spending programs. See Committee on Commerce, National Salvage Motor Vehicle ConSimrer
Protection Act of 1997, HR Rep No 105-285 pt I , t05th Cong, 1st Sess (Sept 30, 1997);
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, hrtemet Filteriug Systems, S Rep
No 105-226, 105th Cong, 2d Sess Oune 25, 1998). One involved an assertion that P.,imz
had little impact because it only struck down an interim provision and "the vast majority
of local law enforcement officials" complied voluntarily. Committee on Judiciary, Violent
and Repeat Juvenile Offender Act of 1997, S Rep No 105-108, 105th Cong, lst Sess 203 (Oct
9, 1997) (views of Senators Kennedy, Biden, Kohl, Feinstein, Durbin, and Torricelli).

191 A Nov 29, 1998, LEXIS search for "Printz v. United States" in the Legis;Cngrst
library of testimony before congressional committees yielded 21 citations; a LEXIS search
for "New York v. United States and Date> 1991" yielded 47 citations.
19J ft might be argued that the Court's overall activism in the area of federalism has raised
the profile of Tenth Amendment constraints on federal authority, even though no particular
case is mentioned in congressional debate. The evidence here might initially suggest such
an effect. Our LEXIS research revealed that, in the six years between June 1986 and July
1992, the Tenth Amendment was mentioned in 88 docwnents in the Congressional Record;
the period between June I 992 (following Ntw York) and July 1998 contains 287 documents
mentioning the Tenth Amendment. But the profile of these mentions makes another explanation more likely. The period 1992-93 contains 17 documents mentioning the Tenth
Amendment; 1993- 94 contains 21. In 1994-95 the documents surge to 108, but 1995-96
contains 63 documents, 1996- 97 contains 34, and 1997-98 contains 44. The fact that the
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The second difficulty with an expressive justification is that,
whatever the impact on norms of political discourse and decision
making, the Court's message is conveyed by invalidating duly enacted federal statutes. Invalidation may impose substantial collateral damage on real people and entities who seek the benefits of
the statutes. In both New York and PTintz, the Court was in a position to deliver its message essentially cost-free. In New Y01·k, the
Court upheld two of three mechanisms for implementing the lowlevel nuclear waste statute, and these two were likely to be adequate to the task. In Printz, the Court struck down an enforcement
mechanism for the Brady Act that was due to be superseded in
short order194 and that, in any event, most states voluntarily followed.195 But the reach of the anticommandeering principle is
hardly limited to issues of peripheral practical importance. The
doctrine's lack of clarity and potential expansiveness are likely to
invite activist members of the lower federal judiciary to constitute
themselves as censors of the federal government in more important
cases. In these subsequent cases, the opportunity to exhort Congress may not come so cheaply.
The imperative not to overrule large bodies of existing case law
has already led the Court to install a series of escape hatches in the
anticommandeering doctrine. In circumstances where significant
federal statutes are at stake, we expect the Court to make use of
those exceptions to allow Congress to work its will, or to find new
exceptions to permit the statute at hand. With the emergence of
a patchwork of ad hoc exceptions, the doctrine will lose whatever
normative force it had initially.
Indeed, the nature of the federal judicial system itself will impose a continued pressure to abandon the field. The Supreme
surge in 1994-95 preceded the Court's exertions in l.opez and Seminole Tribe (70 of the
108 mentions in 1994-95 preceded Lopez, the earlier decision) and subsided at the end of
the congressional term despite the Court's continued activism persuades us that the increase
is better accounted for hy the election of 1994 and the Contract with America. For discussion of the political climate of the period and congressional maneuvering on the issue of
unfunded mandates, see Timothy ]. Conlan ct al, Deregulating Federalism? The Politics of
Mmulllte Refonn in the 104th Congress, PUBLTUS 23 (Summer 1995).
194
Specifically, the provisions stn1ck down in Pri11tz were interim provisions, to be superseded by the Attorney General's establishment of a national instant background check system, which the Act required him tO do by Nov 30, 1998. See 117 S Ct at 2368- 69.
195
See Committee on Judiciary, Violent and Repe11t Juvenile 0/fmder Act of 1997, S Rep
No 105-108, 105th Cong, 1st Sess 203 (Oct 9, 1997) (views of Senators Kennedy, Biden,
Kohl, Feinstein, Durbin, and Torricelli).
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Court cannot review every case decided by the lower federal judiciary; its doctrine w111 be applied by a series of lower court judges
around the country. In the absence of some doctrinal regu larity,
the total work product of the judiciary will collapse into an unworkable hodgepodge. One of the potential virtues of the kind of
common-law approach followed by the Court in the anticommandeering area is the treatment of similarly situated individuals and
institutions in a similar fashion. But, absent some degree of doctrinal predictability, congressional authority will vary from circuit
to circuit, and neither state nor federa l officials will be able to
foresee the scope of their legal authority. The easiest way for the
Court to avoid a flood of federa lism litigation, and to achieve predictability and uniformity, will be to abandon the fie ld. This was
the fate of National League of Cities, and the decision to dodge the
constitutional issue in Yeskey, combined with the denial of certiorari in the parallel case raising the question whether the ADA is
Section 5 legislation, 196 suggests that the Supreme Court has
started down the same road.
To the extent the Court does in fact sustain some collllnandeering challenges, the instrumental difficulty takes on another
cast. Since, as we have argued, the doctrinal lines between permissible and impermissible exercises of national power are unjustified
in light of federalism va lues, the damage to the interests of the
citizenry will be arbitrarily distributed. A doctrine that reinforces
pro-federalism norms in the political process, at the expense of the
interests of an arbitrari ly selected segment of the citizenry, is not
one which does the Court much credit, or which is likely to
strengthen respect for federalism over the long run.
B. EXPRESSING OUR FEDERALISM

Some recent proponents of the expressive function of law maintain that the message contained in a law can play not just the instrumental role of changing norms, but the intrinsic role of consti-

1
~ See Clm·k v Califo171ia, 123 F3d 1267 (9th Cir 1997), cert denied, 118 S Ct 2340 (1998).
While this article was in press, the Court followed the pattern of Yeskey and Clark by
specifically amend ing an order gran ti ng certiorari to exclude the question of whether the
ADA exceeds congre~-sional powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Olmstead v L.C., ll9 S C t 633 (1998).
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turing "the political identity of a state." 197 By parity of reasoning,
the anticommandeering principle of Printz might express the fact
and importance of our regime of constitutional federalism-and
thereby be partly constitutive of that regime-quite apart from
any effect on the political process. Conversely, one might argue
that a law that commandeers state officials expresses an understanding of the political structure at odds with the core federalist
commitments of America.
At one level it is hard to disagree with these kinds of claims,
since what is expressed to some extent lies in the eye of the beholder. If a majority of the Court says that commandeering expresses values at odds with Our Federalism, who can argue? Such
legislation apparently expresses those values to a majority of the
Court.
Still, this is an awfully loose concept with which to make legal
decisions. As we argued above, it is likely to be unstable. Moreover,
as it stands, the doctrine is both substantially overinclusive and
substantially underinclusive relative to federalism values and, relatedly, to the subjective reactions of most of the polity. Despite some
overheated rhetoric surrounding the issue, it is difficult to believe
that the provisions of the Brady Act at issue in Printz-requiring
state law enforcement officers to expend reasonable efforts to determine the legality of gun purchases-express disrespect for federalism sufficient to make them unconstitutional. Does anyone
think that the Brady Act was really read by a substantial segment
of the public as the precursor to the elimination of state sovereignty? New York might have been a stronger case for the expressivist, but the Court has specifically declined to limit the anticommandeering principle to areas which involve political choices and
to policy-making. 198
Reciprocally, given the demarcations that surround it, the anticommandeering doctrine appears to strain at gnats while swallowing
camels. On any sensible definition of federalism, it is hard to distinguish-in tenns of regard for state autonomy-the message expressed by a federal requirement whose sanctions are that a state
"take title" to nuclear wastes (the requirement invalidated by New
191
Jean Hampton, Prmisbmmt, Feminism nnd Politicnlldemity: A Cnse St11dy in tbe t'.Xpressive
Menning of tbe Low, II Can J L & Juris 23, 23 ( 1998).
198
See Printz, 117 S Ct at 2380-81.
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fro~ the message expressed by federal requirements backed
by the threat of preempting state law or of eliminating state access
to federal resources (the requirements upheld in New York). And
does anyone believe that a total preemption of state gun laws
would express less intrusion on state sovereignty than the Brady
Act? 199
To put the point more generally: an intrinsic, expressive theory
of federalism doctrine, to be plausible, must presuppose some objective semantic rules for attaching "meanings" to acts of federal
legislation. But we know of no such rules independent of the federalism values at stake in this area. A federal statute seems to (objectively) say the right thing about federal ism just insofar as it is
otherwise justified on federal ism grounds. Because the anticommandeering doctrines cannot, we have argued, be otherwise justified on federal ism grounds, the expressive story fails as well.

York)

VI.

CONCLUSION

This article has presented an internal critique of the anticommandeering doctrines emerging in New York, Printz, and
Yeskey. Someone who denies that a federal structure serves important values, or that those values take constitutional status, or that
the thus-constitutionalized values ought to be judicially enforced,
will need little persuading that the anticommandeering doctrines
are misconceived. So we have assumed (without endorsement) the
view that some federal statutes should be invalidated by constitutional reviewing courts on federalism grounds, and have argued
that the emerging doctrines fail to sort between permissible and
impermissible statutes in a coherent and attractive way.
The proponent of the doctrines might respond that they have
a textual or originalist warrant. But in fact they have no such warrant, as other scholars have shown.200 We hay;e therefore directed
199 While this article was in press, the Court upheld the jurisdiction of the Federal Communications Commission, under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, to promulgate rules
concerning local telephone pricing and other nspecrs of local telephone market.~, ro be
implemented by state commissions. This led justice Breyer, in dissent, to object that "[t]oday's decision docs deprive the States of practically significant power, a camel COillJ>nrcd
with Printz's 1,rnat." AT&T Corp. v Iowa Utilities Board, 1999 WL 24568, • 32 (US) (Breyer
concurring in parr and dissenting in part).
200 See jackson, II I Harv L Rev at 2199-2200; Caminker, 1997 Supreme Court Review
at 209-17; Caminker, 95 Colum L Rev at 1030-50 (all cited in note 1); Erik M. Jensen
and Jonathan L. Entin, CO>mnandttring, the T mth Ammdmmt, and the Federal Requisition
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our attention, instead, to the question whether the lines of demarcation constitutive of the anticommandeering doctrines can be justified in light of standard federalism values, and we have answered
that question in the negative. It is no response, either, that any
rule-like doctrines will be underinclusive or overinclusive relative
to supporting values. For what we have shown-if we have been
successful-is that the Printz, New York, and Yeskey demarcations
do not even track federalism values in a probabilistic way, let alone
perfectly. There is simply no difference, even in general, between
permissible preemption and impermissible commandeering with
respect to the values of innovation, diversity, tyranny prevention,
and political community- and the same is true of all the other
demarcations except for the Reconstruction Amendment demarcations. Further, the sacrifice in accuracy associated with rule-like
doctrines ought to be made up by a gain in clarity; and yet the
doctrines at issue here are generally quite unclear. These normative failures in the doctrines have, in turn, emboldened us to make
the positive prediction that the doctrines will soon be abandoned,
as was National League of Cities a generation ago. A jurisprudence
that consists of nothing more than some arbitrary rules of "etiquette" ought to be, and we hope soon will be, outgrown.
Power: Nnu York v. United States Revisited, 15 Const Comm 355 (1998). See also Saikrishna
Bangalore Prakash, Field Office Federalism, 79 Va L Rev 1957 (1993) (arguing that original
understanding supports anticommandeering ntle for state legislatures but not executives).

